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1. Introduction 
1.1 Challengesofurbantransportation
Transportation has always played a crucial role in economic activities, pri-
marily explaining the existence of cities, which enable increased productivity 
due to the shorter distances and lower transportation costs. These benefits, 
usually called economies of agglomeration, can be fully utilized as long as the 
capacity of the transportation system is sufficient. The increasing attractive-
ness of cities leads to the scarcity of land to be allocated to buildings, parks, 
parking places, road network, and other purposes. Thus, in urban areas, the 
capacity of the road network and other transportation infrastructures is always 
limited by the scarcity of land and other economic resources. Increasing de-
mand for transportation together with limited road network capacity leads to 
congestions, and consequently to increasing travel time costs, fuel costs, air 
pollution, accidents and noise. See, for example, Verhoef (1994) and Litman 
and Doherty (2009) for detailed analysis of costs of urban transportation. 
Moreover, the increasing use of private cars requires more land for parking 
places near residents, workplaces and shopping centres causing urban sprawl 
and thereby longer travel distances and higher transportation costs. 
Most of the above-mentioned transportation costs are closely dependent on 
the number of vehicle kilometers produced in the transportation system. 
Therefore, one measure to improve the efficiency of the urban transportation 
system is to increase the average occupancy of the vehicles. In private cars, the 
average occupancy is relatively low, for example 1.27 passengers per car in 
Helsinki in year 2008 (YTV, 2009), 1.54 passengers on average in the Western 
European countries in 2007, and respectively 1.8 passengers in the Eastern 
European countries (EEA, 2010). In public transportation the average occu-
pancy is usually much higher, for example, the average occupancy rate of seats 
is 33% in the urban public transportation of the major cities in Finland (Finn-
ish Transport Agency, 2015). Thus, increasing the modal share of public trans-
portation could improve the efficiency of the transportation system and allevi-
ate congestions and other urban transportation problems. However, private 
cars are the dominant mode of passenger transport both in Europe (EEA, 
2015) and the US (Small and Verhoef, 2007), indicating private car attractive-
ness and competitiveness compared to public transportation. 
Several factors increase the use of private cars, but probably one of the most 
essential ones explaining this trend is growing income and wealth (Pucher and 
Renne, 2003). The total vehicle stock is predicted to grow from about 800 mil-
10
lion in 2002 to over 2 billion vehicles in 2030, and the growth will be fastest in 
countries like China and India, which are prospering and passing through the 
middle-income levels of $3,000 to $10,000 per capita (Dargay et al., 2007). 
Several studies have estimated that the valuation of travel time is on average 
50% of the gross wage (Small and Verhoef, 2007). Therefore, increased income 
often leads to increased willingness to pay for faster trips, and private cars as 
enablers of faster trips have offered the most attractive transport mode, espe-
cially for regular use such as commuting, which is the primary reason for the 
morning and afternoon peaks and for the related congestions. 
1.2 Automateddemandresponsivetransportationandshared
taxiservicesaspotentialsolutions
Urban transportation problems could be potentially alleviated by decreasing 
the use of private cars through policies improving the competitiveness of pub-
lic transportation. However, the traditional public transportation with fixed 
schedules and routes has not been capable of responding to the increased 
quality requirements of a growing number of passengers. Therefore, new inno-
vative transportation solutions have been studied and developed by universi-
ties, transport authorities and companies (such as Aalto University, Helsinki 
Region Transport and Ajelo Ltd in Finland) to improve the competitiveness of 
public transportation by means of advanced technologies.  
Demand responsive transportation (DRT) with automated dispatching and 
vehicle routing technology is one realization of this ongoing development of 
intelligent transportation technologies. In the present work, this transport 
mode is called automated DRT to distinquish it from the traditional DRT rely-
ing on human workers in vehicle dispaching and routing. The Automated DRT 
provides shared trips for passengers, and it adapts dynamically to trip requests 
by routing a fleet of vehicles operating without any fixed routes or schedules. 
The main advantages of automated DRT compared with traditional public 
transportation include its ability to provide trips without transfers and it frees 
passengers from the necessity of using timetables and maps of route networks. 
Furthermore, automated DRT utilizes real-time traffic information in vehicle 
routing and in formuling trip offers with travel time promises, which enables a 
differentiated pricing based on travel times and thereby a tailored service pro-
vision meeting personal passenger needs. 
From the viewpoint of trip production, DRT (both the traditional and the au-
tomated one) and a shared taxi are similar as the trips are combined, and oth-
er passengers can cause detours and additional stops. Therefore, the technolo-
gy developed for automated DRT can be utilized also in shared taxi services 
and other similar flexible transportation services offering shared trips. For 
instance, the algorithms developed for the automated DRT service called 
Kutsuplus in Finland has later been adopted by the Split Technology, Inc. for 
operating the service offering shared trips in Washington DC. There are cur-
rently several quite similar services offering shared trips such as CabCorner, 
Lyft Line, UberPool, and Via, which operate in the USA. Moreover, there are 
some services offering shared trips which are more closely linked with the tra-
ditional taxi industry. For example, Wecab offers both private and shared taxi 
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services in Paris. Thus, the automated DRT and shared taxi services adopting 
advanced technologies are similar both from the viewpoints of service charac-
teristics and technologies. In this work, we assume that the only difference 
between these two services is that shared taxi operators can also sell private 
taxi rides if there are vacant taxis. In Section 4 (Publication 3), we show that 
private taxi trips can be seen as a special case of trips with travel time promises 
in economic analysis. For simplicity, we hereon mention only DRT, but the 
results are also applicable to shared taxi services, unless we specify differences.  
1.3 TransportpolicyandDRT(problemstatement)
Consideration of urban transportation as a market reveals several market 
failures, i.e., transportation markets fail to allocate resources efficiently from 
the viewpoint of the whole society. The main reasons behind these failures 
include externalities and imperfect competition. These market failures have 
been extensively studied in transportation economics over one hundred years 
(Winston, 1985), and various policies have been suggested to achieve efficient 
transportation markets and thereby increase productivity and simultaneosly 
alleviate the problems of urban transportation. 
Both theoretical economic analyses and empirical econometric research indi-
cate that transport policies like price regulation, capacity regulation, subsidiza-
tion, and public investments play an essential role in mitigating the inefficien-
cy of transport markets and in solving problems of urban transportation. For 
comprehensive review of related literature and analysis, see, for example, 
Small and Verhoef (2007) and Polak and Heertje (2001). 
The overall objectives of the work are (i) to consider potential economic im-
pacts of the automated DRT and shared taxi services on urban transportation, 
and (ii) to study the effects of various transport policies on these new transport 
services.
The work addresses three main research questions: 
1. How do automated DRT and shared taxi services differ from other public 
transportation services and how should these differenses be modelled in eco-
nomic analysis? 
2. Is the automated DRT cost-effective compared with a private car and a regu-
lar taxi service from the viewpoints of consumers and society? 
3. How should the automated DRT and shared taxi services be priced and reg-
ulated to maximize social welfare? 
1.4 Outlineandkeyfindingsofthework
Section 2 reviews literature on DRT and releated research on bus and taxi 
services. The section considers the main differences between these transport 
modes and presents an analytical model addressing welfare optimal policies 
and unique cost structures of DRT and shared taxi service, as well as is pre-
sents simulation models of DRT. 
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In Section 3, the cost-effectiveness and external costs of the automated DRT 
is studied by simulation model and compared to the regular taxi service and 
private car. The results show that automated DRT can be a more cost efficient 
transportation mode than private car or taxi if the demand density is suffi-
cient. Moreover, the results show that DRT tolerates unexpected demand 
peaks better than regular taxi service when the fleet sizes are fixed in both ser-
vices. This is because the waiting times of the DRT service are more stable due 
to the efficient trip combining organized by the DRT operator whereas the 
regular taxi offers private trips and trips are combined only occasionally based 
on informal negotiation between customers.    
Section 4 analyses a welfare optimal pricing of automated DRT for variable 
trip distances and travel-time promises. Moreover, alternative regulation poli-
cies for DRT monopoly are simulated with a model in which passengers make 
transport mode choices between DRT and other modes (bus and taxi) by com-
paring the offered prices and travel times. A new regulation policy enabled by 
fully automated vehicle routing, which utilizes real-time traffic information, is 
also introduced and studied. The results indicate that the new regulation poli-
cy enables significantly higher social welfare than the considered traditional 
regulation policy of taxi markets, i.e., regulation of the price and the fleef size. 
Furthermore, alternative pricing models are considered. The analysis of the 
empirical data collected from the Kutsuplus service and the review of the relat-
ed literature forms the basis for the evaluation of the service positioning and 
alternative pricing models for the automated DRT. 
Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and suggestions for future research 
directions and transportation policies. 
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2. Economic Models for Automated DRT 
2.1 Literaturereview
2.1.1 DRTresearch
DRT has been considered in several studies, mainly from the transportation 
engineering point of view focusing on dispatching and vehicle routing algo-
rithms and system design, but the economic analysis of DRT markets has re-
ceived less attention. Diana et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive review of 
related research, and they present a model for the fleet sizing of DRT for a giv-
en demand level where service quality is predetermined. The first studies on 
“many-to-many” DRT were conducted by Arrillaga and Medville (1974), Ler-
man and Wilson (1974), Flushberg and Wilson (1976), and Daganzo (1978). 
Arrillaga and Medville (1974) provided models to estimate demand, supply 
and costs of DRT, but since then, the economics of DRT have been less stud-
ied, until the new millennium evidenced growing interest in the automated 
DRT due to the technological advancements. Rodier et al. (1998) adopted the 
regional travel demand model to simulate the travel effects and consumer wel-
fare effects of DRT and other advanced transit alternatives in the Sacramento 
region. The simulation of the scenario where both advanced transit infor-
mation and DRT service was provided increased consumer welfare, although 
the other scenario, where only advanced transit information was provided, was 
economically even more beneficial. Brake et al. (2004) studied experiences 
with telematics-based DRT in the UK and they identified four aspects (regula-
tory, technological, service and system design, and sustainability) as the prin-
cipal areas requiring attention in the future. Diana et al. (2007) studied emis-
sions of DRT services. Kasibhatla and Benjamin (2009) studied alternative 
forms of cost function to estimate and predict the total operating costs of para-
transit services. Häme et al. (2011) presented a network equilibrium model of 
DRT, which was further developed in Häme et al. (2012). 
Recently, several studies have considered the current role of DRT and future 
possibilities in the UK. Wang et al. (2014) explored the effects of area-wide 
factors on the demand of DRT in Greater Manchester and found that the de-
mand was higher in areas with low car ownership, low population density, 
high proportion of white people, and high levels of social deprivation. Ryley et 
al. (2014) studied the contribution of DRT to a sustainable local public 
transport system and simulated modal shares of DRT with mixed logit models 
and survey data collected from urban (Rochdale, Manchester) and rural (Mel-
ton Mowbray, Leicestershire) areas. Their study identified six market niches 
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(1. Rural hopper, 2. Shopping services, 3. Airport access, 4. Station access, 5. 
Employment shuttle, 6. Hospital access) and the simulation results indicated 
that the DRT services offering airport access or railway station access were 
most potential. Davison et al. (2014) explored the current provision of DRT in 
Great Britain and conducted a national survey of DRT providers to examine 
the design, performance, rationale and likely futures of DRT schemes. They 
concluded that cost and funding are the dominant concerns of the service pro-
viders. Recent funding reductions have resulted either in withdrawn of DRT 
service provision or in the replacement of conventional bus services when DRT 
is seen as a more cost-effective alternative to meet local needs for accessibility 
and geographical coverage of public transportation. 
Shared taxi services have been also studied recently. Santi et al. (2014) pre-
sent a method, which translates spatio-temporal sharing problems into a 
graph-theoretic framework providing efficient solutions. They apply the meth-
od for simulation of New York taxi trips and present potential benefits of the 
taxi sharing, such as reduction in cumulative trip length by 40% or even more. 
Paraboschi et al. (2015) studies also impacts of taxi sharing in New York taxi 
system by extending economic model of regulated taxi market, presented orig-
inally by Flores-Guri (2003), to include taxi sharing.
2.1.2 ModelsofbusandtaxiasabasisforDRTmodelling
A DRT is a transportation mode between the regular taxi offering private 
trips from door-to-door and the bus service with fixed routes and schedules. 
The economic significance and market shares of taxi and bus modes have tra-
ditionally been much higher than the market share of DRT services, and con-
sequently, these more conventional transport modes have been studied more 
extensively in the economics of transportation. The economic model develop-
ment of the bus service has been active since Herbert Mohring’s and Ralph 
Turvey’s articles in the 1970’s, i.e., Mohring (1972), Turvey and Mohring 
(1975), and Mohring (1979). Ahn (2009) provides a review of studies on opti-
mal bus frequency and bus fares. 
Respectively, the model of cruising taxis presented in Douglas (1972) activat-
ed research and model development of taxi services (Beesley, 1973; De vany, 
1975; Abe and Brush, 1976; Manski and Wright, 1976; Beesley, 1983; Frankena 
and Pautler, 1986; Arnot, 1996, Flores-Guri, 2003).  
Many of the further developed economic models of bus and taxi services 
were useful for understanding and analysing the DRT service. Especially, the 
bus model presented by Pedersen (2003) provided a useful starting point for 
studying the differences between market characteristics of DRT and conven-
tional public transportation. The major differences on the demand side are in 
the dependencies between time costs, demand, and trip production, which are 
considered in the following. 
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2.2 AnalyticalmodelforDRT(Publication1)
We approach the first research question set in Section 1.3 (How do automat-
ed DRT and shared taxi services differ from other public transportation ser-
vices and how should these differenses be modelled in economic analysis?) by 
formulating an analytical model describing the demand and supply of shared 
trips, and related welfare optimal policies. In the model, the demand for DRT 
trips within a limited geographical area is modelled by the decreasing function 
of the generalized costs, that is, as defined by an ordinary demand function: 
ܺ ൌ ܦሺܩሻǡ ௗ஽ௗீ ൏ Ͳ                                                                                                           (1) 
where X is the number of passengers traveling by DRT during the considered 
time period (for example, one hour or day), and G is the average generalized 
costs, containing  passenger’s money and time costs (including travel time and 
waiting time costs). The average generalized costs of a passenger are defined 
by equation: 
ܩ ൌ ݌ ൅ ݍ ൅ ݇                                                                                                                 (2) 
where p is the ticket fare, q is the average value of waiting time, and k is the 
average value of travel time in vehicle. 
The passenger waiting time for a DRT trip is determined by the time the dis-
patched vehicle drives to the pick-up point, similarly to call taxes, but probably 
with more complex routing due to the simultaneously served customers with 
individual pick-up and drop-off points. An increase in the number of DRT ve-
hicles operating in the service area decrease the expected distance between the 
dispatched vehicle and the pick-up point, and thereby decrease the average 
waiting time. Respectively, an increase in the number of passengers increases 
the expected route length to the pick-up point and the expected number of 
stops before the pick-up point, which consequently increases the average wait-
ing time. These dependencies between the waiting time, number of vehicles 
and number of customers are modelled by defining the average value of wait-
ing time, q, as a function of the trip production, R, and the demand, X: 
ݍ ൌ ܳሺܴǡ ܺሻǡ ௗொௗோ ൏ Ͳǡ
ௗொ
ௗ௑ ൐ Ͳ                                                                                       (3)     
Variable R measures trip production as the number of potential seat kilome-
ters supplied in the considered time period. In the DRT service, the distinction 
between potential and actual seat kilometers is important, because a DRT ve-
hicle is not necessarily moving if it is not (temporarily) dispatched to any trip 
request. In this sense, DRT operates similarly to taxi services, whereas regular 
buses drive their fixed routes based on the time table even though it is empty. 
We show later that the distinction between potential and actual seat kilome-
ters is useful in the analysis of the cost structure of the DRT service. 
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In the DRT service, other passengers increase the value of travel time cost by 
increasing the route length and number of stops. In addition, other customers 
might cause discomfort like crowding and noise in the vehicle. These passen-
ger travel time costs can be reduced by increasing the potential trip production 
level relative to the demand, which consequently also decreases the average 
occupancy of vehicles. Further, the average value of travel time depend on the 
average trip distance, a. Thus, we model the average value of travel time as a 
function of trip production, demand, and average trip distance: 
݇ ൌ ܭሺܴǡ ܺǡ ܽሻǡ ௗ௄ௗோ ൏ Ͳǡ
ௗ௄
ௗ௑ ൐ Ͳǡ
ௗ௄
ௗ௔ ൐ Ͳ                                                                     (4) 
where the signs of the partial derivatives are based on the reasoning above. 
In real transportation services, and especially in non-scheduled DRT services 
and shared taxi services, the dependencies between waiting time, travel time, 
route production and demand are complex, and the functions describing in-
terdependence between waiting time, R and X or interdependence between 
travel time, R, a and X cannot be algebraically expressed for real systems. 
Therefore, we do not interpret the functions (3) and (4) as describing physical 
causality, but the knowledge of the social planner (or the operator) based on 
empirical data, which is modelled by some well-behaved (linear or non-linear) 
functions so that the derivatives in (3) and (4) can be computed. 
We define the inverse demand function by inverting function (1) and using 
equation (2): 
݌ ൅ ݍ ൅ ݇ ൌ ܩ ൌ ܦିଵሺܺሻǡ ௗ஽షభሺ௑ሻௗ௑ ൏ Ͳ                                                                        (5) 
Now, we can write the collective willingness to pay (WTP) of passengers during 
the considered time period by using equations (2)–(5): 
ܹ ൌ ׬ ܦିଵሺݔሻ݀ݔ െ ሾܳሺܴǡ ܺሻ ൅ ܭሺܴǡ ܺǡ ܽሻሿܺ௑଴ ǡ                                                           (6) 
where the first term is the collective gross WTP as a function of the demand 
level, and the second term is the collective time cost of passengers. 
We assume that the total costs of DRT operations, C, can be given by the lin-
ear function: 
ܥ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵܨ ൅ ܿଶܴ ൅ ܿଷܺ ൅ ܿସሺܺܽ ൅ ܾܺሻ ൅ ܿହሺܺܿሻǡ                                               (7) 
where ܿ଴ is the fixed cost of the DRT operator, i.e., costs which are not depend-
ent on the served passenger kilometers or on the capability to produce seat 
kilometers. The parameter ܿଵ is a cost of capital required for the capability to 
produce 1 seat kilometer during the considered time period, which is multi-
plied by the variable F measuring the quantity of the capital, respectively. The 
parameter ܿଶ is a cost of operations required for capability to produce 1 seat 
kilometer during the considered time period, which is multiplied by the varia-
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ble R measuring the quantity of the operations, respectively. These first three 
terms in the cost function (7) are related only to the capability to serve passen-
gers. A simple interpretation would be that the first term represents general 
costs incurred for the DRT operator, such as costs of premises and administra-
tion, and the second term represents capital costs of vehicles and the required 
equipment, and the third term represents costs of the driver’s salary and costs 
related to the operations management and the ICT system during the consid-
ered time period.   
The last three terms in the cost function are related directly to the number of 
passengers, X. The parameter ܿଷ is a distance-independent cost for an addi-
tional customer, i.e., costs incurred from dispatching and additional stops for 
boarding and alighting from the vehicle. The parameter ܽ  is an average trip 
distance where the distance is based on the shortest route between the pick-up 
and drop-off locations. Thus, the term ܺܽ is the number of served passenger 
kilometers excluding detour kilometers, typical for DRT vehicle routing, from 
the term. The parameter b is an average detour on a trip. Thus, the term 
ሺܺܽ ൅ ܾܺሻ is the total kilometers travelled by passengers in vehicles, and the 
parameter ܿସ is a route-independent cost of a passenger traveling 1 kilometer 
in DRT vehicle, i.e., increase in fuel consumption due to the extra weight, con-
tamination, and abrasion of seats. The last term ܿହሺܺܿሻ  is the costs of driven 
kilometers by DRT vehicles. The parameter c is an average increase in vehicle 
route length due to an additional trip, i.e., route change enabling pick-up and 
delivery. Multiplying c with the number of customers, X, gives the total kilo-
meters driven by the DRT fleet. The parameter ܿହ is the cost of kilometer driv-
en by an empty vehicle. The cost of empty vehicle is used in this term, because 
the costs of the weight of customers are taken into account in the previous 
term, ܿସሺܺܽ ൅ ܾܺሻ.  A linear function was adopted in the cost function (7) be-
cause it provides a simple and illustrative way to present the cost structure of 
DRT and the differences compared to the cost structure of conventional bus 
and taxi services. Moreover, linear cost functions are seen to be good proxies 
for more advanced cost functions. See, for example, Pels and Rietveld (2000) 
and Jørgensen and Preston (2007). 
A feasible level of operations required for potential seat kilometers, R, is con-
strained by the quantity of operator’s capital, i.e., the fleet size and related 
equipment, measured by the variable F. We define this constraint by the fol-
lowing inequality: 
ܴ ൑ ܷܨǡ                                                                                                                            (8)
where U is an upper limit for the utilization rate of capital, which will, in prac-
tice, be below 1 due to necessary pauses in service for refueling, maintenance, 
and breaks or changes of drivers. 
A feasible level of served passenger kilometers, ܺܽ, during the considered 
time period is constrained by capability to provide service, in our terms, by the 
level of operations required for potential seat kilometers, R. We define this 
constraint with the following inequality: 
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ܺܽ ൑ ܱܴǡ                                                                                                                         (9) 
where O is an upper limit for the occupancy rate of vehicles (ratio of the occu-
pied seat kilometers to the potential seat kilometers), which is normally dis-
tinctly below 1. 
We define social welfare as the passengers’ WTP, defined in equation (6), 
minus the transport operator’s costs, defined in equation (7). An alternative 
and equal formulation for the objective is the maximisation of the sum of pas-
sengers’ surplus and operator’s profit (loss). In both of these formulations, the 
welfare effect of taxation to cover possible losses of transport operator is ne-
glected.
The social planner’s (can be interpreted as a public authority in charge of so-
cially optimal transport policies and operations) objective is to maximise the 
welfare, with regard to X, R, and F, subject to the restrictions in (8) and (9). 
The Lagrangean function for the maximisation problem can be formulated as: 
ܮ ൌ ܹ െ ܥ െ ߣሺܽܺ െ ܱܴሻ െ ߤሺܴ െ ܷܨሻ                                                                   (10) 
The following first-order conditions for optimal X, R, and F can be derived: 
డ௅
డ௑ ൌ ܩ െ ݍ െ ݇ െ
డொ
డ௑ ܺ െ
డ௄
డ௑ ܺ െ ሺܿଷ ൅ ܿସܽ ൅ ܿସܾ ൅ ܿହܿሻ െ ߣܽ ൌ Ͳ                       (11)                        
                 
డ௅
డோ ൌ െ
డொ
డோ ܺ െ
డ௄
డோ ܺ െ ܿଶ ൅ ߣܱ െ ߤ ൌ Ͳ                                                                      (12) 
డ௅
డி ൌ െܿଵ ൅ ߤܷ ൌ Ͳ                                                                                                       (13) 
In equation (11), the term డொడ௑ ܺ is the increase in the waiting time costs the pas-
senger causes for other passengers. The term  డ௄డ௑ ܺ is, respectively, the increase 
in the in-vehicle travel time costs the passenger causes for other passengers. 
This externality is normally higher in the DRT service than in conventional 
public transport services with fixed routes and schedules, because with DRT, a 
new passenger usually causes route changes, and consequently increases the 
travel time cost for other passengers significantly. In equation (12), the terms 
డொ
డோ ܺ and 
డ௄
డோ ܺ describe savings in travel time costs and waiting time costs due 
to a marginal increase in route production. 
In modeling regular bus services with fixed routes and schedules, the social 
planner’s maximisation problem can be analysed by separating the time span 
into three time periods (short, medium, and long run), where in the short run 
only the ticket price is a decision variable, whereas in the medium term, the 
route production can also be changed, while bus capacity can only be changed 
in the long run (Pedersen, 2003). Unlike DRT, in conventional bus services 
separation into potential and actual route production is not needed, because 
after deciding and publishing the timetables, the buses drive routes according 
to the fixed schedules regardless of actual demand in the short run.  
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In the DRT service, the distinction between decision variables and fixed vari-
ables in a certain time period is not as clear, and not necessarily even similar. 
The main difference is that DRT is not tied to fixed schedules, and therefore 
route production, R, can be increased relatively fast, even instantly, to match 
the supply for the sudden demand peaks, presuming that extra vehicles 
(measured by the variable F) and drivers are available. Depending on how the 
DRT service production is organised, the variable F might be fixed in the short 
run if, for instance, an increase in the fleet size requires bureaucratic decision 
making and procurement of vehicles and related equipment. Alternatively, 
more flexible organising forms of service production could be applied. For in-
stance, the DRT operator could use charter transportation companies as sub-
contractors and agree on the option to request extra vehicles and drivers for 
the unexpected demand peaks, which would enable as fast changes in F as 
changes in p and R. 
If capital and operations are fully utilized, the constraints (8) and (9) are 
equalities, and optimal p, R, and F can be deduced from equations (11)–(13):
݌ ൌ డொడ௑ ܺ ൅
డ௄
డ௑ ܺ ൅ ܿଷ ൅ ܿସܽ ൅ ܿସܾ ൅ ܿହܿ ൅ ܽ
௖భ
ை௎ ൅ ܽ
௖మ
ை ൅ ܽ
డொ
డோ
௑
ை ൅ ܽ
డ௄
డோ
௑
ை,             (14) 
ܽܺ ൌ  ൌ 	.                                                                                                           (15) 
Optimal price is equal to the marginal costs of operator (terms 3–8 in equation 
(14)) plus external costs to the passengers (terms 1–2) minus value of travel 
time savings from increased route production (terms 9–10). 
The presented model and deduced optimality treats travel distances only as 
averages. Thus, the optimal price (14) can be interpreted as the optimal flat 
rate. Flat rates are often used in public transport pricing for political (equity 
and income distribution) and practical reasons (easy for implementation and 
payment). Thus, the presented optimality is interesting both theoretically and 
in practice. However, in many DRT services, pricing is based on the trip dis-
tance. Moreover, marginal costs of DRT trips are strictly dependent on trip 
distances, almost similarly to taxi trips. Therefore, a trip distance is an im-
portant element of socially optimal production and pricing policies of DRT 
services. Pricing policies based on trip distances are considered analytically in 
Section 4.
2.3 Simulationmodels
Publications 2 and 3 examine automated DRT with a simulation model 
adopted from (Hyytiä et al., 2010), where trip requests occur within a bounded 
region. Each trip request is defined as a triple, (ݐ௜, ݋௜, ݀௜), where ݐ௜  denotes the 
time instance (release time) of the ith request, ݋௜  and ݀௜ denote the origin and 
the destination of the trip, respectively. Trip requests arrive according to a 
Poisson process with rate Ǌ[trip/s], and for each trip request, both the pick-up 
and drop-off locations are uniformly distributed in a finite convex region with 
area A (i.e., the trip requests arrive according to a Poisson point process). 
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There are K vehicles each with s passenger seats providing DRT trips in an 
online fashion. We assume Euclidean distances between any two points and 
thus each vehicle follows the direct path between the waypoints that define the 
route. In addition, the ordering of waypoints is determined in a way that the 
route length is minimised. When a trip request arrives, it is immediately as-
signed to a single vehicle according to alternative policies and related algo-
rithms. The chosen vehicle then, at some point of time, picks up the passenger 
for delivery to the corresponding destination point. With restriction s=1, the 
model can be used to simulate a regular taxi service and with s > 1 a DRT and 
shared taxi services, where several passengers can share a vehicle, which al-
lows the system to combine trips and decrease the effort per passenger.  
Moreover, there are some additional assumptions and specific parameter 
values in the simulation model in publications 2 and 3 in order to adapt the 
model for spesific context and research questions. 
2.3.1Simulationwithfixeddemandlevel(publication2)
The first modification of the simulation model with a fixed demand levels 
(exogenious variable) is designed for cost efficiency and resiliency compari-
sons between DRT, taxi and private car. In the model, trip requests arrive to a 
10 km l 10 km rectangular area. In this area, K vehicles operate, each capable 
of transporting at most 10 persons simultaneously, that is, s = 10. Vehicles 
have a constant speed of 10 m/s, they move freely in the given area (i.e., there 
is no road network), and each stop takes at least 30 seconds (including decel-
eration and acceleration). Moreover, there is a regular 250 m l 250 m stop 
grid laid over the service area. In all simulation experiments, we applied a 10-
hour warm-up period that was followed by a 10-hour simulation period, dur-
ing which the statistics were collected. In the numerical examples, the 10-hour 
simulation period is assumed to represent a one day busy period of operations, 
e.g., a demand density of 1 trip/km2/hour results in 1000 trips per day, and 
the demand densities varied between 1 and 50 in the simulations.   
The simulated automated DRT system includes the following service prom-
ise, which is applied as the default unless otherwise stated: the maximum ad-
justment time is 15 minutes and the maximum waiting time 5 minutes. The 
maximum system time is 5 minutes plus 1.5 times the direct ride time of the 
trip. The factor 1.5 in the maximum system time is labeled as ride time factor 
(RTF). A service promise is also made in the taxi system so that the maximum 
time difference between the order time and pickup time is 15 minutes. Trip 
requests in the taxi system are immediate, i.e., customers are ready for the 
pickup at the order time. DRT trip orders, however, include a 5 minute pre-
order time, which customers reserve for preparations and walking from trip 
origin to the pickup stop. Simulations are used for both taxi and DRT modes, 
while the simplicity of the model allows axamination of the private car mode 
analytically. A crucial element of the model (and of the real DRT services) is 
the policy defining the routes of the vehicles in response to trip requests. This 
(first) version of the simulation model utilizes a greedy heuristic policy re-
ferred to as minimise-passenger-travel-time (MPTT). MPTT assigns a new trip 
to a vehicle which can, according to the current information (cf. myopic con-
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trol), deliver all current passengers, including the new one, with the smallest 
increase in the sum of the passengers (remaining) travel time. Thus, MPTT 
does not explicitly take into account the anticipated future requests (Ichua et 
al., 2006). For a more detailed description and analysis on MPTT and related 
heuristic policies, see, for example, Hyytiä et al. (2010), and Toth and Vigo 
(2001). The optimal control of the vehicle fleet is, in fact, a complicated prob-
lem in general, and one can indeed do better than what this heuristic policy 
can offer. However, the differences are not qualitative, and as the heuristic 
MPTT policy already provides on average a relatively good and robust solution, 
it satisfies the needs of the cost-effictiveness and resiliency comparison (pre-
sented in Section 3 and Publication 2). 
2.3.2Simulationwithdemandmodel(publication3)
The second modification of the simulation model is designed for the analysis 
of the DRT monopoly market and related regulation policies. In this model, 
the deman level is defined by the demand model, where passengers compare 
prices and travel times and then choose the transportation mode between a 
DRT offer and other modes. Vehicle routes are defined similarly to the first 
modification, i.e., ordering of waypoints with minimised route length, but in-
stead of MPTT policy in vehicle allocation, the monopolist compares all availa-
ble proposals formulated by vehicles, and offers the customer a single proposal 
maximising the expected profit. If an offer is accepted, the customer is as-
signed to the corresponding vehicle and its route is modified accordingly. This 
version of the simulation model can be characterized as an agent-based simu-
lation model, which simulates the behavior of independent agents (passengers 
and the monopolist), whose decicions are defined by certain rules in the com-
plex system. For a more detailed introduction and review of agent-based mod-
els in transportation, see for example Bernhardt (2007) and Axelrod and 
Tesfatsion (2006).  
The model is governed by the following six preliminary assumptions: 
1. There are K vehicles available to transport customers requesting service 
within a certain operating zone A. For each pair of points ݋௜  and ݀௜ in A, the 
distance d(݋௜, ݀௜) and direct ride time t(݋௜, ݀௜) are known and equal for all ve-
hicles.
2. At each moment, each vehicle is assigned a certain set of customers and a 
tentative route passing through all unvisited pick-up and drop-off points asso-
ciated with these customers. In this work, we assume that the vehicles follow 
the shortest route with respect to known customers. 
3. At any moment, a new customer may request a trip from a specific pick-up 
point ݋௜  to a specific drop-off point ݀௜ constituting a request for trip (݋௜, ݀௜). In 
addition, each request is associated with a unit load (1 passenger/request). 
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4. As an instant response to each customer request, each vehicle formulates at 
most one proposal for transportation by means of the following procedure: a 
new route is determined, passing through the pick-up and drop-off points as-
sociated with already assigned customers and the new customer. The expected 
pick-up and drop-off times are calculated by means of this route, as depicted 
in Figure 1. 
5. The monopolist compares all available proposals formulated by vehicles, 
and offers the customer a single proposal maximising the expected profit. If an 
offer is accepted, the customer is assigned to the corresponding vehicle and its 
route is modified accordingly (see Figure 1). 
6. There is a fixed fare structure. The price, p, of a trip is assumed to be de-
pendent on the direct trip length d(݋௜, ݀௜) exclusively by means of the formula 
p(݋௜, ݀௜) = ݌௞௠ · d(݋௜, ݀௜)                                                                                            (16)                                          
                                                                                                         
where ݌௞௠ is the price per kilometer in relation to direct trip length. The cus-
tomers know the fare structure and the direct trip lengths of their trips before-
hand.
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Figure 1. Formulating proposals. The top figure (a) shows the pick-up points (denoted by ՛-
signs) and drop-off points (՝-signs) of nine customers and the initial locations of vehicles A, B 
and C. Each customer i requests a trip from ݅՛  to ݅՝ at time t = ݐ௜, where ݐଵ < ݐଶ < …<ݐଽ. The 
bottom figure (b) shows the modifications in the route of vehicle A. At the time customer 3 re-
quests a trip (t = ݐଷ), the vehicle is located at A(ݐଷ). A new route for the vehicle, namely (͵՛, ͵՝),
beginning from A(ݐଷ) is calculated and the expected pick-up and drop-off times, ݐଷ௣ and ݐଷௗ, are 
determined by means of the new route. Customer 3 accepts the proposal and the vehicle route is 
updated. Customers 7 and 8 are added to the vehicle route in a similar fashion. The figures on 
the right show the routes as so-called labeled Dyck paths (Cori, 2009; Häme, 2011), in which 
each pick-up ݅՛ precedes the corresponding drop-off ݅՝. After each step, a new path is formed 
due to the addition of a new customer. Clearly, the "height" of the path shows the number of 
customers aboard in different parts of the route. 
In this model, the level of service is defined by means of travel time ratio, 
which is the ratio of travel time to direct ride time. Thus, a travel time ratio 
equal to 1 corresponds to the best possible level of service and a larger travel 
time ratio corresponds to a lower level of service. Since the fare structure for 
trips is assumed to be fixed, the only question a customer faces after request-
ing service is whether or not to accept the best trip offer in terms of the offered 
level of service. In other words, in this simulation model the fixed fare struc-
ture and the offered level of service define the generalized passenger cost of 
the trip. The level of service offered to a customer traveling from ݋௜  to ݀௜ is de-
fined by means of expected travel time ratio: 
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߬ ൌ ௧೏ି௧ೝ௧ሺ௢೔ǡௗ೔ሻ,                                                                                                                      (17) 
where ݐௗ is the expected drop-off time, ݐ௥ is the release time of the request and 
t(݋௜, ݀௜) is the direct ride time from ݋௜  to ݀௜. Thus, ߬ describes the ratio of the 
expected travel time of a given trip offer to direct ride time. Clearly, since ݐௗ-ݐ௥
൒ t(݋௜, ݀௜), we have ߬ ൒1, and ߬=1 corresponds to the best possible offered level 
of service. 
Due to modifications in the vehicle routes, the offered level of service may be 
different from the final outcome of the service. We define the realized travel 
time ratio ߬ᇱ by means of the formula: 
߬ᇱ ൌ ௧೏ᇲ ି௧ೝ௧ሺ௢೔ǡௗ೔ሻǡ                                                                                                                    (18) 
where ݐௗᇱ is the realized drop-off time, that is, the point of time the customer 
actually reaches the destination, ݀௜.
We assume that potential DRT customers always have alternative transpor-
tation mode where the surplus is zero. Thus, a customer rejects the DRT trip 
offer if the expected surplus is negative and travel by some other transporta-
tion mode. In addition, we associate with each customer a certain willingness 
to pay, which describes the maximum price the customer accepts for a certain 
level of service. The three assumptions that hold for all passengers, and thus 
form the basis for the demand model, can be summarized as follows: 
1. Denote the average travel time ratio of service provided by a conventional 
taxi by ்߬ and the price per kilometer of a taxi by ݌். If the travel time ratio 
offered by the DRT service is greater than ்߬and the price per kilometer is 
greater than ݌், no customer accepts the DRT offer. 
2. Denote the average travel time ratio of service provided by traditional bus 
transportation by ߬஻ and the price per kilometer by ݌஻. We assume that ߬஻ > ்߬
and ݌஻ < ݌். That is, the average level of service (inverse on travel time ratio) 
and price per kilometer of traditional bus transportation are lower than those 
of a taxi. If the travel time ratio offered by the DRT service is greater than ߬஻
and the price per kilometer is greater than ݌஻, no customer is willing to accept 
the offer. 
3. Finally, if the travel time ratio offered by the DRT service is less than ்߬ and 
the price per kilometer is less than ݌஻, each customer accepts the offered DRT 
trip.
In this simulation model, we assume a linear demand model, in which the 
fraction of customers that are willing to accept a certain level of service for a 
certain price increases linearly from (்߬, ݌் ) to (்߬ , ݌஻) and from (߬஻, ݌஻) to 
(்߬ǡ ݌஻). Thus, the three points (்߬, ݌், 0 ), (߬஻, ݌஻, 0) and (்߬, ݌஻, 1) define a 
linear demand model as a plane in R3, as presented in Figure 2. 
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Clearly, ݌௞௠ሺ்߬ሻ ൌ ݌் and ݌௞௠ሺ߬஻ሻ ൌ ݌஻. We define the willingness to pay, 
WTP, with level of service Ĳ as a real-valued random variable ܹሺ߬ሻ by means of 
the uniform distribution 
ௐ݂ሺఛሻ ൌ ܷሺ݌௞௠ሺ߬ሻ െ ሺ݌் െ ݌஻ሻǡ ݌௞௠ሺ߬ሻሻ                                                                   (21) 
The random variable ܹሺ߬ሻ describes the price per kilometer that an arbitrary 
customer is willing to pay, when the level of service Ĳ is known. For a trip 
ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ , an arbitrary customer is willing to pay not more than the price 
ܹሺ߬ሻ ή ݀ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ, that is, WTP = ܹሺ߬ሻ ή ݀ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ.
The acceptance probability with the given service level and price per kilome-
ter is equal to the corresponding cumulative distribution function: 
ܲሺܽܿܿ݁݌ݐȁ߬ǡ ݌௞௠ሻ ൌ ܲሺܹሺ߬ሻ ൒ ݌௞௠ሻ ൌ ׬ ௐ݂ሺఛሻሺݔሻ݀ݔஶ௣ೖ೘                                      (22) 
For each realized trip ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ with the price per kilometer ݌௞௠  and realized 
travel time ratio ߬ᇱ, the realized surplus ܵᇱ is defined as the difference between 
WTP, that is, ܹሺ߬ᇱሻ ή ݀ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ, for the realized level of service and the actual 
price paid for the trip ݌ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ ൌ ݌௞௠ ή ݀ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ, that is, ܵᇱ ൌ ܹܶܲ െ ܴሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ. If 
the customer does not accept the DRT trip offer, the realized surplus is zero as 
assumed previously. The expected surplus is thus given by 
ܧሾܵȁ߬ǡ ݌௞௠ሿ ൌ ܲሺܹሺ߬ሻ ൒ ݌௞௠ሻ ή ൫݀ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ ή ܧሾܹሺ߬ሻȁܹሺ߬ሻ ൒ ݌௞௠ሿ െ ݌ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ൯(23)
where ܧሾܹሺ߬ሻȁܹሺ߬ሻ ൒ ݌௞௠ሿ is the expected WTP on the condition that an offer 
with the expected level of service Ĳ and price per kilometer ݌௞௠ is accepted. 
The DRT monopoly faces the trip demand defined by the demand model and 
decides the number of the vehicles and the price, and selects trip offers to 
maximise profits (as stated in the preliminary assumption 5). We provide a 
more detailed descrption of the decisions of the monopolist in Section 4.2, 
where this simulation model adopted to analyse impacts of regulation policies. 
Table 1 summarizes the main parameters and differences between the two 
versions of the simulation model. The main difference in these models is that 
in the first version the trip demand is given (exogenious variable), whereas in 
the second version demand is defined by the demand model (endogenious var-
iable). This and other differences in the versions are based on different re-
search goals of the model versions, that is, the first version is designed for 
cost-effectivess comparison (Section 3) and the second for analysis of regula-
tion policies and pricing (Section 4.2).   
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Table 1 
The Basic Simulation Parameters of the Two Versions of the Simu-
lation Model 
Basic simulation pa-
rameters
Model version I Model version II 
trip request rate 0.03/s – 1.39/s 0.25/s – 1.00/s 
simulation time 10 hours 12 hours 
area 10 km l 10 km disk with 5 km radius 
speed of vehicles 10 m/s 10 m/s 
capacity of vehicles 10 10 
stop time 30 s 30 s 
Fixed costs 230 € per vehicle per day 200 € per vehicle per day
Variable costs 0.16 € per vehicle km 0.5 € per vehicle km 
Fleet routing policy MPTT 3 policies: profit maxima-
tion and 2 regulation poli-
cies 
2.4 Discussiononthepresentedmodels
This chapter has already given some answers to the first research question 
asking how automated DRT differs from other public transportation services 
and how these diffecenses should be modelled in economic analysis. Section 
2.2 explained and formalized the main differences between DRT, regular bus 
and taxi services from the economic viewpoint (trip production, externalities) 
with the analytical model. Section 2.3 presented an alternative or complemen-
tary modelling approach. Instead of deriving analytically economic optimality 
conditions, the outcome of the complex transportation system can be also 
studied by simulation models where the behavior of agents (passengers, vehi-
cles and operator) is defined by certain rules. This modelling approach usually 
cannot provide such a deep analytical or theoretical understanding of the stud-
ied phenomenom, but it enables examination of outcomes of complex systems 
which can be analytically untractable.  
These two approaches can be taken simultaneously especially in the large 
multidiciplinay transportation research projects. Moreover, both approaches 
can utilize existing theory and results of transportation economics (and other 
diciplines like transportation engineering and operations research). In the first 
approach, the link to the existing theory is usually stonger, as in the model 
presented in Section 2.2, which can be seen as an extension or reformulation 
of the economic model of the bus service presented in Pedersen (2003). In 
contrast, the link to the theory also exists in the second approach, but is 
somewhat weaker, i.e. the behavior or decision rules of the agents are based on 
the theory of microenomics, but the market outcome is based on the computer 
simulations.
These approaches and models are adopted to analyse different policy issues 
in Sections 3 (cost-effectiveness) and 4 (pricing and regulation). In Section 5, 
we return to this methodological discussion related to the first research ques-
tion after presenting the research results enabled by the models introduced in 
this section. 
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3. Cost-effectiveness analysis 
This section studies and compares the cost-effectiveness of the most flexible 
(motorized) transport modes, that is, DRT, taxi, and private car. By cost-
effectiveness we mean that the cost of satisfying a given traffic demand is small 
when compared with the alternative transport modes. Note that these flexible 
modes in the comparison cannot compete in cost-effectiveness with mass 
transport modes such as regular bus, train and metro in situations where the 
demand and occupancy rate are high and the destinations coincide sufficiently. 
However, these regular mass transportation modes cannot be adjusted dynam-
ically based on the changing demand, and building a new train or metro line is 
a massive effort in terms of money and time. In contrast, DRT, taxi and private 
car can adapt to changes in demand extremely fast, even instantly. 
In the cost-effectiveness comparison, we adopt simulation model I (Section 
2.3.1) to study the services and realized internal and external costs at the vari-
ous demand levels, which also enables us to consider the economies of scale of 
the transport modes.  
3.1 Internalcosts
We first consider internal costs only and then external costs in Section 3.2. 
Table 2 presents the values for the unit costs. The costs are classified to fixed 
costs, which are independent of the vehicle kilometers travelled, and to the 
variable costs, which are assumed to increase linearly with vehicle kilometers. 
We compare the costs of the alternative transportation modes for a one-day 
period. Therefore, the fixed costs are also calculated and presented for one 
day. Fixed costs for the taxi and DRT vehicles are defined as a sum of an own-
ership cost per day and a labour cost of a vehicle driver per day, whereas the 
fixed cost of a private car consists of ownership costs only.  
We assume that each private car travels 2.9 trips per day based on the num-
bers presented in (Helsinki Region Transport, 2010), which describes passen-
ger transportation in the Helsinki metropolitan area. We obtained values for 
the unit costs from (Litman and Dorethy, 2009). The variable costs are applied 
without any changes from the source, but for the fixed costs, we have made 
some adjustments. The second major component of the fixed cost after the 
labour cost is vehicle depreciation, which is estimated for 24 000 kilometers 
annual usage. Therefore, we adjusted the annual depreciation of taxi and DRT 
vehicles according to the realized vehicle kilometers, which was assumed to be 
105 000 kilometers per year for a DRT vehicle and respectively 82 000 kilo-
meters for a taxi. We used the average bus driver salary $16.14 per hour in the 
United States (Worldsalaries.org, 2008) as a labour cost, which is multiplied 
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by 1.3 in order to take into account other related staff expenses. Finally, we 
added 10% to the DRT and taxi total costs to cover traffic system operation 
costs, which is based on our own estimate of the cost of the automated traffic 
system operation, where human labour is not needed in trip dispatching and 
selling, the only necessary human worker being a vehicle driver. 
Table 2 
Cost Items Applied in the Comparison 
Cost item Definition Value $ 
Fixed cost of private car Insurance per year, licence & registration, Depreciation 
(9320 kilometers/year), fi-
nancing 
15.33 per day 
Variable cost of private car Gas & oil, maintenance, tires 0.11 per km 
Fixed cost of taxi Same as private car + labour 
cost
15.33 + 210.00 per day 
Variable cost of taxi Same as private car 0.11 per km 
Fixed cost of DRT Same as private car + labour 
cost
19.92 + 210.00 per day 
Variable cost of DRT Same as private car 0.16 per km 
Cost calculations based on simulation results, presented in Figure 3, indicate 
that DRT is a cost-effective transport mode compared to private cars and taxis. 
Costs per trip by private car (black line) are invariant at the various demand 
levels. The costs of taxi and DRT trips decrease as the demand level (demand 
density) increases, that is, both transport modes have economies of scale, 
which is a well-known feature of taxi services in transport literature, see for 
example Arnot (1996) and Small and Verhoef (2007). The average cost of a trip 
is lower with DRT than with the other modes at all presented demand levels 
due to efficient trip combining. However, efficient trip combing requires a suf-
ficient demand level, and in the simulations, DRT is a cost-effective transport 
mode compared with the private car only if the demand level is over 1 000 
trips per day.  
30
Figure 3. Estimated average cost per trip as a function of trips per day. 
Table 3 
Key Performance Figures 
Quantity Transport Demand level (trips per day = 10 hour period) 
 mode 5000 10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 50 000 
Number of vehicles private car 1724 3448 6897 10345 13793 17241 
 DRT 57 98 171 236 300 359 
 taxi 173 302 446 611 776 943 
Average occupation private car 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 DRT 1.86 2.20 2.62 2.85 3.00 3.18 
 taxi 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Mean travel time Private car 9.19 9.19 9.19 9.19 9.19 9.19 
(minutes) DRT 18.05 17.77 18.11 18.10 17.90 18.05 
 taxi 11.11 10.87 10.96 11.11 11.18 11.08 
Table 3   presents the essential descriptive numbers from the simulations 
used in the cost comparisons. The fleet size required to satisfy a given demand 
is significantly lower in the DRT mode than in the other transport modes at all 
demand levels (5 000–50 000 trips per day). Moreover, the mean occupation 
of DRT vehicles is also higher, and it increases along with higher demand lev-
els.  
Note that we have not yet considered the travel time cost, which forms a sig-
nificant part of the total travel costs of the passenger, that is, generalised pas-
senger costs. For example in (Litman and Doherty, 2009), travel time costs 
represent 16.2% of all direct travel costs of a private car driver. It was a chal-
lenging task to estimate a passenger’s value of time spent on traveling by au-
tomated DRT, because at the time the simulations for cost-effectiveness com-
parison was implemented (in 2011), the automated DRT service was not oper-
ating yet, and therefore, data for estimation was unavailable.  
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The new and useful service features of automated DRT, such as shared trips 
from origin to destination with travel time promises and without transfers and 
an exemption from using timetables and route information, most likely affect 
the passenger’s value of time. In Section 4, we present empirical estimation of 
value of time based on the data collected in 2013 and 2014, but in the cost-
effectiveness comparisons of this section (publication 2), we employed an es-
timate of a car driver’s travel time value from (Litman and Doherty, 2009), 
which is $0.072 per minute (Orinally, the value was given as per mile, but we 
changed it as per kilometer and adjusted the cost value to match the travel 
speed applied in the simulations).  
A trip by DRT takes approximately 9 minutes longer than by a private car, 
which means a $0.65 higher travel time cost. Figure 1 shows that DRT is the 
most cost-effective transport mode despite of the higher travel time cost, be-
cause the average cost difference between private car and DRT without time 
cost is over three dollars. This result is naturally depending on the adopted 
value of time, but it is valid also for significantly higher values and for the pre-
sented empirical estimates of travel time value averaging around 50% of the 
gross wage rate (Small and Verhoef, 2007). For instance, we used 0.17€ per 
minute (§$0.19) for value of travel time in Publication 1. The value is approx-
imately 50% of the average gross wage rate in Finland. With this higher value 
of time, the 9 minutes longer travel time means a $1.71 higher travel time cost 
for DRT compared to private car. Thus, DRT is clearly the most cost-effective 
transport mode also with the higher value of time adopted in Publication 1, 
because the difference in pecuniary costs is over three dollars.  
The travel time of a DRT trip includes an adjustment time, that is, the time 
between customer-defined earliest pick-up time and the target pick-up time of 
a trip. As customers can spend the adjustment time at trip origin on other ac-
tivities (personal or work-related), it is not necessarily accurate to use as high 
time value for adjustment time as for waiting time when estimating travel time 
costs.
3.2 Externalcosts
As discussed in Section 1, the use of private cars creates external costs such 
as air pollution, noise, and travel time costs as a consequence of congestion on 
the road network. A DRT system naturally causes also external costs, but as 
the total vehicle kilometrage is reduced due to a higher mean occupancy of 
vehicles, significant external cost savings can be gained.  
This section investigates the external costs of transportation in six scenarios, 
where a certain share of private car users (0%, 10%, 20%,..,50%), resulting in 
the total of 100 000 trips per day, change their transport mode to DRT or to 
taxi, and relinquish their private cars. We apply unit cost values for external 
cost from (Litman and Doherty, 2009). The unit cost values of a private car are 
adopted for private cars and taxis, and the unit cost values of a van with a ca-
pacity of 14 passengers for a DRT vehicle. The cost values were originally pre-
sented separately for urban peak hours, urban off-peak hours and rural travel. 
 In this section, we adopt the average external cost values of urban peak and 
off-peak hours, that is, considering only trips in the urban area, and we as-
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cost-effectiveness of DRT was less obvious, and on the demand level of 1 000 
trips or below, the results indicated poor cost-effectiveness compared with 
private cars. In the light of these results, it is understandable why DRT is typi-
cally seen as an expensive mode of transport, and why recently the modern 
automated DRT service in Finland (Kutsuplus) has required relatively high 
subventions, which have exceeded 80% of total costs during the first operating 
years of 2013 and 2014 in Helsinki (Helsinki Region Transport, 2015). The 
service area of Kutsuplus was somewhat larger (approximately 14 km l 9 km) 
than the area in the simulations, but the realized demand was on average 283 
trips per day in September 2014 (Publication 1), and the number of the vehi-
cles was 15. This means the scale has been far below the cost-effective levels of 
the simulations. For the first years, the relatively high subventions of 
Kutsuplus can be justified by the fact that the service is totally new and unique, 
and therefore the first years are challenging before the technology is matured, 
oparations optimized, and the passengers used to the new service. The first 
years are challenging and relatively expensive but enable learning and adapta-
tion. Thus, the relatively high piloting costs can be seen as an investment in 
learning and development. 
In the long run, significanly higher subvention rates compared to the tradi-
tional public transportation (approximately 50% in Helsinki) can be difficult to 
justify for the DRT service, except for special groups such as the elderly and 
handicapped. The optimal subsidization level is interrelated with pricing and 
regulation policies, and a more detailed consideration of this interrelationship 
is presented in Section 4. As a main conlusion drawn from the results present-
ed in this section, DRT is a cost-effective mode compared with private car and 
taxi if the scale is sufficient high. Moreover, the presented simulation results of 
the DRT service indicate significant economies of scale, which is traditionally 
seen in the transportation ecomics literature as an argument for subsidization 
of public transportation in addition to aims for equal accessibility and reduced 
external costs.    

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4. Transport policies and DRT 
This section considers the third main research question of the present work 
related to the welfare optimal pricing and regulation policies of the automated 
DRT and shared taxi services. A welfare optimal policy of public transporta-
tion, in general, is a wide research topic in transportation economics, and it 
can be divided into several sub-topics. One major distinction can be made be-
tween the first-best and second-best policy. In the first-best policy, the policy-
maker has full information about preferences and technology and there are no 
restrictions on the set of policy instruments and on the set of economic agents 
to whom the instruments can be applied, whereas in the second best policy, 
some of these restrictions are prevailing or the information is imperfect (Grav-
elle and Rees, 1997). The analysis of the first-best policy is important for theo-
retical modelling and for understanding the economics of public transporta-
tion, and it also provides useful insights into real policy design. However, in 
reality there are typically many constraints prevailing related to the formula-
tion of transport policy, and therefore the analysis of second-best policies can 
provide policy-makers with more practical and useful advices. 
In this section, the main focus is on the first-best (pricing and production) 
policies of DRT services with alternative demand specifications. However, we 
also discuss the automated DRT and shared taxi services in a wider context as 
an integral part of public transport and the urban transportation system with 
many constraints on policy design. Moreover, we analyse alternative pricing 
models (fare structures) and related regulation policies.             
4.1 Pricing
Tripwise marginal costs vary significantly in transportation services, and es-
pecially in the automated DRT and shared taxi services. These costs are allo-
cated between transport operators, customers, and society with variable 
weighting depending on the market structure and transport policy. Socially 
optimal pricing sets the trip fare at the level of the marginal social cost. A 
complete schedule of marginal-cost prices would distinguish many trip charac-
teristics, including distance, time of day, direction, and the density of loadings 
and boardings (Small and Verhoef, 2007). Section 2.2 presented the analytical 
model of the DRT service and derived the socially optimal price, which was 
equal to the marginal costs of the operator plus external costs caused for other 
passengers minus value of travel time savings from increased route produc-
tion. This model and the derived optimal price takes into account only exter-
nalities for other DRT passengers. Thus, a more comprehensive definition of 
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optimal price should include also the other social marginal costs, that is, the 
external costs for the other users of the road network (congestion costs and 
accident costs), and the external costs for the entire society (for example, air 
pollution, noise and CO2 emissions). Before discussing pricing policies and 
DRT in a wider context of urban transportation systems, this study focuses on 
analytical modelling of the specific characteristics of the automated DRT. 
More precisely, the analysis centres on the impacts of trip distances (Section 
4.1.1), travel time promises (Section 4.1.2), and related marginal costs on pric-
ing.
4.1.1 AnalysisofdistanceǦbasedpricing
To analyze the impact of trip distance on the optimal pricing policy, we re-
formulate the analytical model presented in Section 2.2 by defining demand 
for each trip distance, which are assumed to be integers for simplicity: 

ܺௗ ൌ ܦௗሺܩௗሻǡ ௗ஽೏ௗீ೏ ൏ Ͳǡ݀ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ݊Ǥ݊±ܰǤ(24)

We reformulate the cost function (7) by dividing operator costs into the dis-
tance-independent component (ܥ௖) and distance-dependent component (ܥௗ):

ܥ௖ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵܨ ൅ ܿଶܴ ൅ ܿଷܺ(25)

ܥௗ ൌ ܿସሺܺௗ݀ ൅ ܺௗܾௗሻ ൅ ܿହሺܺௗܿௗሻ(26)

Equation (25) consists of the first four terms of the cost function (7) with the 
same interpretations of parameters. In equation (26), d is the direct trip dis-
tance, and ܾௗ is the related detour, and ܿௗ is an average increase in the vehicle 
route length due to the additional trip with a direct distance, d.
As in Section 2.2, the social planner’s objective is to maximise welfare, but 
this time defined first for each trip distance, and then aggregated to define the 
total welfare as an objective function. The welfare maximisation problem can 
be formulated as: 

ܮ ൌ σ ሺ ௗܹ െ ܥௗሻ௡ௗୀଵ െ ܥ௖ െ ߣ ቀሺσ ݀ ௑೏௑௡ௗୀଵ ሻܺ െ ܱܴቁ െ ߤሺܴ െ ܷܨሻ(27)

ൌ σ ቄ׬ ܦିଵሺܺௗሻ݀ݔ௑೏଴ െ ൣܳௗ൫ܴǡ ଵܺǡǥܺ௡൯ ൅ ܭௗ൫ܴǡ ଵܺǡǥܺ௡ǡ ݀൯൧ܺௗ െ ܥௗቅ௡ௗୀଵ െ ܥ௖

െߣ ൬ቀσ ݀ ௑೏௑௡ௗୀଵ ቁܺ െ ܱܴ൰ െ ߤሺܴ െ ܷܨሻǡ

where the value of waiting time cost, ܳௗ൫ܴǡ ଵܺǡǥܺ௡൯, and value of in-vehicle 
travel time cost, ܭௗ൫ܴǡ ଵܺǡǥܺ௡ǡ ݀൯, are functions of potential route production 
and demand levels for all trip distances. The potential route production and 
capital are utilised to produce trips simultaneously for all the distances, there-
fore the related constraints can be formulated as previously, except that the 
average trip distance is now a weighted average, σ ݀ ௑೏௑௡ௗୀଵ Ǥ Adoption of this 
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weighted average in equation (27) requires assumption that all passenger kil-
ometers consume vehicle capacity equally. Depending on the vehicle routing 
algorithm applied, it is possible that shorter trips have relatively higher con-
sumption of vehicle capacity due to the higher ratio of the pickup kilometers to 
the passenger kilometers, which can be taken into account with weighted aver-
age σ ݀ ௑೏௖೏௑௖௡ௗୀଵ  . For simplicity, in the following text we adopt the assumption 
and the weighted average, σ ݀ ௑೏௑௡ௗୀଵ .
If potential route production and capital are fully utilized, then the optimal 
R, F, and ݌ௗ can be deduced: 
݌ௗ ൌ෍ሺ
߲ܳ௜
߲ܺௗ ௜ܺ ൅
߲ܭ௜
߲ܺௗ ௜ܺ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ሻ ൅ ܿଷ ൅ ܿସ݀ ൅ ܿସܾ ൅ ܿହܿௗ ൅ ݀
ܿଵ
ܱܷ ൅ ݀
ܿଶ
ܱ 

൅σ ሺ݀ డொ೔డோ
௑೔
ை ൅ ݀
డ௄೔
డோ
௑೔
ை
௡௜ୀଵ ሻ(28)

ቀσ ݀ ௑೏௑௡ௗୀଵ ቁܺ ൌ ܱܴ ൌ ܱܷܨǤ(29)

In the equation (28), the external travel time and waiting time costs of the 
trips are summarised over all trip distances. Respectively, the travel time sav-
ings for passengers due to the increased route production are summarised over 
all distances. Equations (28) and (29) define the socially optimal trip produc-
tion and allocation of fleet capacity for variable trip distances. 
One consequence of appying price ݌ௗ (28) instead of price based only on the 
average distance as defined in equation (14) is that passengers travelling long-
er distances pay higher prices, which is reasonable from the viewpoint of social 
marginal costs. As we mentioned in Section 2.2, there might be other political 
arguments for flat price, sush as equity and income distribution. The social 
planner choosing the pricing model between a flat rate (14) and a distance 
based pricing (28) needs to compare the value of political objectives requiring 
flat rates and value of increased efficiency due to the use of distance based 
pricing.
4.1.2 Analysisofpricingbasedontraveltime
Consideration of travel time as the basis for the pricing model leads to an op-
timization problem similar to distance based pricing. To analyse the impact of 
travel time promises on optimal policies, we reformulate the model presented 
in Section 2.2. We assume that total demand is divided into the demands of 
two passenger groups with different values of travel time. Moreover, we as-
sume that the DRT operator is capable of making reliable travel time promises 
with trip offers. We define the demand for DRT trips by the two passenger 
groups with the following demand function: 

ܺ ൌ σ ௜ܺ௜ ൌ ܦ௜ሺܩ௜ሻǡ ௗ஽೔ௗீ೔ ൏ Ͳǡ݅ ൌ ݄ǡ ݈ǡ(30)

where h stands for the passenger group with a high value of travel time, and l
for a low value of travel time, respectively. 
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In the origal cost function (7), all the cost components are presented as sepa-
rated additional terms, but in this section, the modeling of the trip production 
costs with travel time promises requires some reformulations. Therefore, we 
define three cost functions: one for both types of travel time promises (ܥ௟ and 
ܥ௛) and one for common costs (ܥ௖):

ܥ௖ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵܨ ൅ ܿଶܴ൅ܿଷܺ(31)

ܥ௟ ൌ ܿସሺ ௟ܺܽ ൅ ௟ܾܺ௟ሻ ൅ ܿହሺ ௟ܺܿ௟ሻ(32)

ܥ௛ ൌ ܿସሺܺ௛ܽ ൅ ܺ௛ܾ௛ሻ ൅ ܿହሺܺ௛ܿ௛ሻ(33)

The less tight travel time promises allow vehicles to serve more customers 
simultaneously by combining trips, which consequently increases detours in 
the trips. It is therefore reasonable to assume that an average detour is longer 
for trips with less tight travel time promises, that is, ܾ௟ ൐ ܾ௛Ǥ Furthermore, an 
average increase in the vehicle route length due to the additional trip is higher 
with tighter travel time promises due to the weaker trip combining possibili-
ties. We therefore assume that ܿ௛ ൐ ܿ௟. For the same reason, the tight travel 
time promises decrease the average occupancy rate of vehicles, which must be 
taken into account in the constraint related to the level of operations required 
for potential seat kilometers, R. Therefore, we reformulate the constraint (9): 

௟ܺܽ ൅ ܺ௛ܽ ൑ ሺ ௟ܱ ௑೗௑ ൅ ܱ௛
௑೓
௑ ሻܴ(34)

where ܱ௛ ( ௟ܱሻ is an upper limit for the occupancy rate if all trips have tighter 
(less tight) travel time promises. We assume that the upper limit for the total 
occupancy rate of the fleet is a weighted average of ௟ܱ and ܱ௛, ቀ ௟ܱ ௑೗௑ ൅ ܱ௛
௑೓
௑ ቁǤ
In practice, more accurate estimates for the total occupancy rate of the fleet 
could be estimated with collected travel data. In addition, the dependence be-
tween the total occupancy rate and ௟ܱ and ܱ௛ could be more complex than the 
presented weighted average. However, we assume that the presented weighted 
average provides a good approximation for various market conditions, and we 
adopt it in the following text.  
As in Section 2.2, the social planner’s objective is to maximize welfare, but 
this time defined first for both types of travel time promises, and then aggre-
gated to define the total welfare as an objective function. The welfare maximi-
zation problem can be formulated as: 

ܮ ൌ σ ሺ ௜ܹ െ ܥ௜ሻ െ ܥ௖௜ െ ߣ ቀܽܺ െ ቀ ௟ܱ ௑೗௑ ൅ ܱ௛
௑೓
௑ ቁܴቁ െ ߤሺܴ െ ܷܨሻ(35)

ൌ σ ቄ׬ ܦିଵሺ ௜ܺሻ݀ݔ௑೔଴ െ ሾܳ௜ሺܴǡ ௟ܺ ǡ ܺ௛ሻ ൅ ܭ௜ሺܴǡ ௟ܺ ǡ ܺ௛ǡ ݀ሻሿ ௜ܺ െ ܥ௜ቅ௜ െ ܥ௖ 

െߣ ቀሺ݀ܺ െ ቀ ௟ܱ ௑೗௑ ൅ ܱ௛
௑೓
௑ ቁ ܴቁ െ ߤሺܴ െ ܷܨሻǡ
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
where the value of waiting time cost, ܳ௜ሺܴǡ ௟ܺ ǡ ܺ௛ሻ, and value of in-vehicle time 
cost, ܭ௜ሺܴǡ ௟ܺ ǡ ܺ௛ǡ ܽሻ, are functions of potential route production and demand 
levels for both travel time promises. The potential route production and capital 
are utilized to produce trips simultaneously for both travel time promises, 
therefore the related constraints can be formulated as in Section 2.2, except 
that the upper limit for the occupancy rate is a weighted average of ௟ܱ and ܱ௛,
ቀ ௟ܱ ௑೗௑ ൅ ܱ௛
௑೓
௑ ቁǤ
As in Section 2.2, the optimal R, F, and ݌௜ can be deduced: 

݌௜ ൌ෍ቆ
߲ܳ௝
߲ ௜ܺ ௝ܺ ൅
߲ܭ௝
߲ ௜ܺ ௝ܺቇ௝
൅ ܿଷ ൅ ܿସሺܽ ൅ ܾ௟ሻ ൅ ܿହܿ௟
൅ܽ ௖భቀை೗೉೗೉ାை೓೉೓೉ ቁ௏
൅ ܽ ௖మቀை೗೉೗೉ାை೓೉೓೉ ቁ
൅ σ ቆܽ డொೕడோ
௑ೕ
ቀை೗೉೗೉ାை೓
೉೓
೉ ቁ
൅ ܽ డ௄ೕడோ
௑ೕ
ቀை೗೉೗೉ାை೓
೉೓
೉ ቁ
ቇ௝ ǡ(36)

ܽܺ ൌ ቀ ௟ܱ ௑೗௑ ൅ ܱ௛
௑೓
௑ ቁ ܴ ൌ ቀ ௟ܱ
௑೗
௑ ൅ ܱ௛
௑೓
௑ ቁܷܨǤ(37)

In the equation (36), the external travel time and waiting time costs of the 
trips are summarized over both travel time promises in the term σ ቀడொೕడ௑೔ ௝ܺ ൅௝డ௄ೕ
డ௑೔ ௝ܺቁ. Respectively, the travel time savings for passengers due to the in-
creased route production are summarized over both travel time promises in 
the term σ ቆܽ డொೕడோ
௑ೕ
ቀை೗೉೗೉ାை೓
೉೓
೉ ቁ
൅ ܽ డ௄ೕడோ
௑ೕ
ቀை೗೉೗೉ାை೓
೉೓
೉ ቁ
ቇ௝ . Thus, equations (36) and (37) 
define socially optimal trip pricing and production, and allocation of fleet ca-
pacity for trips with variable travel time promises (or service classes). 
Conventional private taxi rides can be interpreted as the fastest possible 
travel time promise (direct ride time), including the promise that other cus-
tomers are not served simultaneously by the vehicle. Thus, shared taxi services 
offering both shared and private rides, such as Wecab in Paris, can be de-
scribed by means of this model, in which case ܥ௟ stands for costs related only 
to the shared rides, and ܥ௛ for costs related only to the private taxi rides. In the 
private taxi rides, there are no detours caused by other passengers, therefore 
in the cost function (33), the term ܺ௛ܾ௛ is zero. Moreover, passengers travel-
ling by private taxi rides cause time costs for other passengers only due to the 
increased waiting time costs, therefore the in-vehicle time cost term 
ܭ௜ሺܴǡ ௟ܺ ǡ ܺ௛ǡ ܽሻ takes the forms ܭ௟ሺܴǡ ௟ܺ ǡ ܽሻ and ܭ௛ሺܴǡ ܽሻ, and consequently the 
term 
డ௄ೕ
డ௑೔  in equation (36) is zero if i=h, or if j=h, that is ,
డ௄೓
డ௑೓ ൌ
డ௄೗
డ௑೓ ൌ
డ௄೓
డ௑೗ ൌ Ͳ.
In the formulation of an optimal pricing policy, it is important to note that, 
even though, the private taxi ride causes travel time costs for other customers 
only through waiting time cost, these costs are not, in general, the same as 
with shared taxi rides. They are, in fact, most likely much higher especially 
during demand peaks of taxi trips when demand typically exceeds the taxi 
supply level temporarily.   
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If the demand for shared rides is sufficient for efficient trip combining, as in 
the simulations of Section 3, the cost per shared ride is lower than the cost per 
private ride, and the optimal price for shared ride is lower than the optimal 
price for private ride. In this situation, the market share of private rides de-
pends on passenger willingness to pay for privacy and faster trips, which is 
mainly determined by the passenger’s value of travel time savings.  
4.1.3 Numericalexamples
We have modelled socially optimal pricing and production policies for flat 
rates (alternatively interpreted as constant distance), variable distances, and 
travel time promises. The following numerical examples illustrate the adoption 
of the presented models for empirical analyses of service production and pric-
ing policies. We collected empirical data from the DRT service (Kutsuplus) 
operated by the Helsinki Region Transport in Finland. The data were collected 
during 16 weekdays both in September 2013 and in September 2014 from the 
automated trip trading system. The data consist of 4 852 trips and provide 
values for variables defining generalized costs of the demand, that is, prices, 
waiting and travel times. Unfortunately, the data on the cost side of the DRT 
service were available only on the aggregate level. Therefore, we adopt the cost 
estimates presented in literature, complemented with reasonable assumptions.  
We specify demand, X, as the log-linear function of generalized cost, G: 
ܺ ൌ ݀଴ܩିௗభǤ                                                                                                                  (38) 
Following Jørgensen and Preston (2007), we assume the value of the demand 
elasticity with respect to generalized cost as 1.5, that is, ݀ଵ=1.5. With the as-
sumed demand elasticity and data on the average daily demand and general-
ized costs, we estimate the parameter ݀଴ of the demand function. The parame-
ter values and empirical values of the variables are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Values of Parameters Based on Estimations, Literature and Rea-
sonable Assumptions and Base Values for Variables Based on Em-
pirical Data from Helsinki
Parameters / Variables Values
Demand (empirical base value), per day 283  
   Elasticity, ݀ଵ 1.5
݀଴ 9 453 
Value of time (€ per minute) 0.17 
Average waiting time 7.21 
Average value of waiting time, q 1.20 
Average in-vehicle time 22.81 
Average value of in-vehicle time, k 3.80 
Average price (empirical base value), p 5.37 
Average distance (km) 7.14 
   Marginal waiting time externality, డொడ௑
0.003 
   Marginal in-vehicle time externality, డ௄డ௑
0.0009 
   Marginal waiting time external effect of fleet capacity, డொడோ
-0.00008 
   Marginal in-vehicle time external effect of fleet capacity, డ௄డோ
-0.000007 
Utilization rate of capital, U 0.8 
Occupancy rate, O 0.06 
Production costs  
   Fixed cost per day, ܿ଴ 3 504 
   Cost of capital per seat kilometer, ܿଵ 0.006 
   Cost of operations per seat kilometer, ܿଶ 0.098 
   Distance-independent cost of passenger, ܿଷ 0.016
   Route-independent cost of passenger per kilometer, ܿସ 0.005 
   Cost of kilometer driven by an empty vehicle, ܿହ     0.146 
The value of time is estimated as 50% of average wage, which is in Finland 
approximately 20 € per hour leading to the value of 0.17 € for minute and, for 
simplicity, it is assumed to be equal for waiting time and in-vehicle time. The 
values of the demand, waiting time, in-vehicle time and price in Table 4 are 
based on the mean values of the data from year 2014. This means that the base 
values roughly describe the autotomate DRT service (Kutsuplus) in September 
2014.
The fleet size was increased from 10 vehicles in year 2013 to 15 vehicles in 
year 2014. Thus, the combined data from 2013 and 2014 enable estimating the 
effects of variable fleet capacity and demand level on travel times. The increase 
in the waiting time cost the passenger causes for other passengers, డொడ௑, and the 
decrease in the waiting time cost due to increased fleet capacity, డொడோ, are esti-
mated by means of the linear regression model, where the dependent variable 
is the waiting time and the explanatory variables are the fleet capacity and the 
number of customers in the service at the time of the trip request. Similarly,డ௄డ௑
and డ௄డோ are estimated with the linear regression model where the dependent 
variable is the in-vehicle time and the explanatory variables are as in the first 
regression model. Thus, the estimates of డொడ௑,
డ௄
డ௑,
డொ
డோ and 
డ௄
డோ  in Table 4 are re-
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gression coefficients multiplied by the value of time based on the data from 
2013 and 2014. 
The utilization rate of capital, U, is assumed to be 0.8, and the occupancy 
rate, O, is assumed to be 0.06. This is based on the observed maximum occu-
pancy rate during morning peak hours in September 2014, that is, the average 
produced seat kilometers during the peak hour (193) divided by the potential 
seat kilometers of the fleet per hour (3 240). 
The value of the fixed cost per operating day, ܿ଴, is based on the annual gen-
eral costs of the Kutsuplus service (841 037€ in  year 2014) announced in Hel-
sinki Region Transport (2015). The other parameter values of the cost function 
in Table 4 are based on estimates presented in literature, complemented with 
reasonable assumptions. The value of parameter ܿଵ (0.006) is based on our 
rough estimate that the annual capital cost for a DRT vehicle is 10 000€, re-
sulting in 27.4€ daily costs, which is divided by the daily vehicle capacity to 
produce seat kilometers (4 590). The capacity is calculated by multiplying the 
seat number (9), the average speed (30 km/h) and the number of the operat-
ing hours (17), i.e., 9l30l17 = 4 590 and 27.4/4 590 § 0.006. The value of pa-
rameter ܿଶ (0.098) is based on the driver’s salary (15 €/h) for 17 operating 
hours plus additional operating costs totalling 360€ daily costs, which is divid-
ed by the daily quantity of operations measured by potential seat kilometers 
(R) per vehicle (R=UlF=0.8l4 590=3 672), i.e., 360/3672 § 0.098. The value 
of parameter ܿଷ (0.016) is based on the assumed fuel price (1.5 €/L) and idle 
fuel consumption (1.6L/h), and on the average dwelling time of 11.84 seconds 
presented by Dueker et al. (2004), i.e., 2l11.84l1.5l(1.6/3 600) § 0.016. The 
value of parameter ܿସ (0.005) is based on the assumed passenger total weight 
(70 kg) and fuel price (1.5 €/L), and on the result that on average every 100 kg 
weight reduction yields a 0.39L/100 km reduction in fuel consumption 
(Cheah, 2010), i.e., 0.39/100l(70/100)l1.5 § 0.0041, which is increased to 
0.005 to take into account other costs related to the parameter (see Section 
2.2). The value of parameter ܿହ is based on the estimated variable vehicle op-
erating costs (an average of urban peak and off-peak) of van/light track pre-
sented by Litman and Doherty (2009). 
The values presented in Table 4 are applied in numerical simulations of the 
presented model and its variants with different pricing policies, i.e., flat rate 
pricing, distance based pricing and pricing based on service classes with travel 
time promises. Table 5 presents the simulation results for the three cases and 
empirical base values based on data from September 2014. 

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Table 5 
Simulation Results for Three Cases: Flat Rate Pricing, Distance-
based      Pricing, and Service Classes with Travel Time Promises  
Variables  Empirical 
base val-
ues 
Flat
rate
Distance-
based 
Service 
classes 
     
Demand, X 283 96 99 110 
                X, 3.00 km 25 - 12 - 
                X, 7.14 km 233 - 79 - 
                X, 9.00 km 25 - 8 - 
                X, economy class 229 - - 87 
                X, normal class 54 - - 23 
Average waiting time, WT  7.21 25.23 25.41 25.45 
                WT, economy 8.57 - - 26.04 
                WT, normal 5.72 - - 23.19 
Average value of waiting time, Q 1.20 4.20 4.23 4.24 
Average in-vehicle time, TT 22.81 23.81 23.28 25.26 
                TT, 3.00 km 15.28 - 15.71 - 
                TT, 7.14 km 22.81 - 23.83 - 
                TT, 9.00 km 28.12 - 29.14 - 
                TT, economy class 24.89 - - 25.89 
                TT, normal class 21.85 - - 22.85 
Average value of in-vehicle time
K
3.80 3.97 3.88 4.21 
Price (flat/ weighted average), 
P
5.37 13.12 12.47 12.22 
                P, 3.00 km 3.88 - 5.71 - 
                P, 7.14 km 5.37 - 13.10 - 
                P, 9.00 km 6.04 - 16.43 - 
                P, economy class 5.37 - - 12.18 
                P, normal class 6.71 - - 12.39 
Quantity of capital, F 68 850 14 274 13 990 16 360 
Quantity of operations, R 55 080 11 419 11 192 13 088 
Total costs, C 9 564 4 816 4 797 5 007 
Total revenue 1 520 1 260 1 234 1 345 
Social welfare  -2 173 541 514 887 
As Table 5 shows, in all the three cases, the optimal values for R and F are 
significantly lower and prices higher compared with the base values, which 
leads with clearly longer waiting times and somewhat longer in-vehicle times 
to the lover demand levels than with the base values. In the simulations of var-
iable trip distances, we selected one short distance (3 km) and one long dis-
tance (9 km) with an approximately equal market share in the data. We then 
made a simplifying assumption that the rest of the trips have the average dis-
tance, allowing us to restrict the analysis to the three distances. In the case of 
distance-based pricing, the price of the long-distance trip is relatively much 
higher than in the base values, and respectively the share of long-distance trips 
(9 km) is lower than short-distance trips (3 km). In the case of service classes 
with travel time promises, the price difference between the service classes de-
creases and the share of the normal class trips increases. These numerical re-
sults are as expected based on our analytical results, that is, longer distances 
increase costs and optimal prices, which reflects on demand. The relatively 
small price difference between the service classes can be explained by the low 
occupancy rate, which causes that the realised travel times of the service clas-
ses differs only marginally. 
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In all the three cases, the total costs are much lower compared with the base 
value. A straightforward social welfare comparison between the cases based on 
the figures in Table 5 is not reasonable because the demand functions are 
specified differently in each simulation. In the case of flat rate pricing, the de-
mand function is specified for trips with the average distance, whereas in the 
case of distance-based pricing, the demand functions are specified for the 
three distances, and in the case of service classes, the demand functions are 
specified for two service classes. Moreover, the social welfare estimated for the 
base values is also based on flat rate pricing, whereas the real pricing model of 
the DRT service is more complex, including group discounts, starting fees, 
distance-based pricing, and service classes with travel time promises.  
However, the social welfare comparison of the pricing policies is an im-
portant issue and relates closely to the third main research question of this 
work. Therefore, to illustrate the use of the model for welfare comparison be-
tween pricing policies, we simulated the optimal flat rate pricing policy with 
the demand functions for the three distances as in the case of distance-based 
pricing, which resulted in a 6% decrease in the share of short-distance trips 
and a relatively small decrease in the (daily) social welfare from 514 € to 499 
€. More detailed modeling of distances would increase the number of the dif-
ferent trip distances, and consequently, the welfare differences would also be 
higher between the pricing policies. Furthermore, inclusion of external costs of 
vehicle kilometers for other than DRT passengers (Section 3.2) in the model 
would increase the difference between the pricing policies.  
4.1.4 Exploratoryanalysisofpricingmodelsandprinciples
The presented numerical examples illustrate how the analytical model, pre-
sented in Section 2.2, and its variants, presented in this section, can be adopt-
ed to define optimal prices and trip production for DRT services with alterna-
tive pricing models. Moreover, the numerical examples show that the selection 
of the pricing model affects social welfare. This is in line with the economic 
theory of the socially optimal prices, which states that prices should be equal 
to the social marginal costs. This condition is usually difficult to fulfill com-
pletely in pricing transportation services, but some pricing models can satisfy 
the condition more completely than others, which also depend on the prevail-
ing market conditions and the transportation system. The variety of alternative 
pricing models (or fare structures) for transportation services is basically un-
limited, for instance, public transit operators often adopt relatively complex 
pricing models, including the combination of several ticket types, nighttime 
tafiffs, special group discounts and zone pricing.  We conducted exploratory 
analysis of alternative pricing models and principles in transportation services 
to identify the most applicable models for the automated DRT based on the 
principle of marginal cost pricing and other criteria. 
In the analysis, we define pricing model as a concrete system that defines 
prices for different trips, whereas pricing principles are general principles that 
can be applied to pricing models to modify them to better respond to the re-
quirements and objectives of the customers, transport operators, and society. 
A pricing principle in itself does not define any concrete pricing model. The 
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presented pricing models and principles are mainly identified through litera-
ture review and observation of pricing models adopted by operators (Publica-
tion 5). Moreover, the analysis is based on data and experiences from the 
Kutsuplus service. The main purpose of the analysis is to evaluate the suitabil-
ity of the pricing models and principles for the automated DRT service. 
We have identified four main criteria for the pricing models based on the 
general policy objectives to increase the attractiveness of public transportion 
and efficiency of urban transportation systems, and on the spesific features of 
the automated DRT. The main criteria for the suitability of pricing models are:  
1. Fast growth: The pricing model is compatible with a fast growth strategy.  
2. Competitiveness: The pricing model enables exploitation of the competi-
tive advantages of the automated DRT in different customer segments.  
3. Compatibility: The pricing model for automated DRT can easily be inte-
grated into the pricing models of other public transport services.  
4. Marginal cost pricing: The pricing model enables fulfilling the condition 
that trip prices are equal to the social marginal cost. 
The first criterion, that is, the need to support fast growth at an early phase 
of the service launch is based on the supply and demand side scale economies 
of the automated DRT. In a pricing model selection (or formulation), it is rea-
sonable to emphasize the first criterion at the service launch, and later, at a 
more mature phase when a sufficient market share and related scale econo-
mies are achieved, the pricing model can be modified to more effectively at-
tend to the other criteria. This type of pricing model modification, which 
evolves dynamically over time, is not typical for public transport, but for the 
automated DRT it can be justified by the need to first increase the market 
share and then attend more accurately to the emerging customer needs and 
other policy objectives. 
The second criterion is related to the potential competitive advantages of the 
automated DRT in relation to private cars, which are the lower costs especially 
in the long run due to the capital costs of private cars, ease of use, and envi-
ronmental friendliness (if a sufficient average occupancy rate is achieved). In 
Section 3, we showed by simulations that at a sufficient demand level, the au-
tomated DRT is more cost-effective than private car, which enables competi-
tive price setting. By ease of use, we mean that automated DRT relieves private 
car users from the need e.g. to search for parking spaces, overhaul their vehi-
cles, refuel, and scratch ice off the windows. In the long run, current private 
car users probably represent the greatest potential customer segment for the 
automated DRT, but especially in the launch phase, other public transporta-
tion users also represent an important customer segment. The automated DRT 
service can be a particularly attractive service for public transportation users 
who need to transfer frequently and suffer from uncertain connections. Thus, 
45
the second criterion means that pricing models should enable exploitation of 
these sources of competitiveness, which varies with customer segments.  
The third criterion is also related to competitiveness, and is based on the 
transport policy objective for the development of the automated DRT (dis-
cussed in Section 1) to increase attractiveness of public transportation as a 
whole compared with private car. Thus, the third criterion means that pricing 
models should foster cooperation between public transport modes to fulfill 
passengers’ daily varying and constantly changing travel needs.  
The fourth criterion is based on the previously discussed condition that trip 
prices are equal to the social marginal cost. In practice, it is impossible to ful-
fill this condition completely with a simple pricing model such as flat rate. On 
the other hand, a pricing model which could capture social marginal costs, that 
is, both the production costs and external costs such as pollution and conges-
tion for other modes, perfectly would probably be too complex to understand 
for customers.  
The four main criteria were adopted for the analysis of the five pricing mod-
els: (1.) flat rate pricing model, (2.) fixed kilometer price with a fixed starting 
fee, (3.) fixed minute charging with a fixed starting fee, (4.) fixed term pricing 
model, and (5.) zone pricing model, which were identified as typical models 
for transportation services.  
The flat rate pricing model is simple and therefore easy to understand, and 
it is commonly adopted pricing model for transport services. Therefore, the 
flat rate pricing model makes the decision whether to test or to use the auto-
mated DRT occasionally easy. It also supports the fast growth strategy during 
the launch phase, provided the trip price is also set at a competitive level. On 
the other hand, it may not be attractive for regular users in contrast to, for 
istance, 30-day tickets of public transportation. Moreover, the flat rate model 
treats all customers similarly, but not necessarily equally, because it prices 
trips similarly without considering the variable marginal costs of trips. For 
instance, the flat rate model favors customers making long-distance trips at 
the expence of short distance passengers. Thus, we can conclude that the flat 
rate model fulfills criteria 2 and 4 poorly or not at all. 
The second pricing model is based on a fixed kilometer price with a fixed 
starting fee, which is typical for taxi services. In automated DRT, the kilometer 
price should be based on a direct trip length, to avoid charging of additional 
kilometers (detour) due to new customers. From the viewpoint of our criteria, 
this model is somewhat similar to the flat rate model. Customers are familiar 
with it thanks to their experiences with taxi services and find it easily under-
standable. One difference compared to the flat rate model is that a customer 
cannot typically determine the exact price of the trip beforehand or before the 
trip request. The other difference is that it takes trip length into account in 
price determination, which enables adoption of marginal-cost pricing for the 
trip to a certain extent, but still enables capturing the incurred marginal costs 
before the pick-up only as an average. 
The third pricing model is based on a fixed minute charging with a fixed 
starting fee. This pricing model is typically adopted when a taxi is asked to 
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wait for a customer in a certain location, or when the speed of taxi cabs is low 
on congested roads. In automated DRT, this pricing model causes notable un-
certainty for customers, because travel time is usually more difficult to esti-
mate than trip distance. One advantage of this model from the efficiency view-
point is that it creates an incentive for customers to avoid travelling during 
peak periods. The model adoption for automated DRT in its basic form, that is, 
positive values for per-minute price and starting fee, would contradict with the 
second criterion (competitiveness), and with the policy objective to increase 
attractiveness of public transportation, because a longer travel time, that is, 
lower quality of service, for a certain trip means higher price. Travel time is an 
essential element in the pricing of the automated DRT, but the pricing model 
should take travel time into account conversely, by pricing faster trips at a 
higher price, because faster trips based on travel time promises cause higher 
production costs and external travel time costs for other DRT passengers, as 
explained in Section 4.1.2.  
The fourth pricing model is the fixed term pricing model (season ticket), 
which allows unlimited travelling with a certain fixed price during a certain 
time period, typically, for example, a day or a month. This model is common in 
conventional public transport and it normally applies a nonlinear pricing prin-
ciple, which means, for instance, that one 30-day ticket is cheaper than 30 one 
day tickets. The pricing model is attractive for regular users such as commut-
ers and students, and therefore can support the objective of fast growth. In 
contrast, the model creates risks for the supply side, because it is difficult to 
predict the trip demand if passengers have an unlimited right to use the ser-
vice. Therefore, some form of constraining the daily traveling per passenger 
should be considered with the model. In principle, this model can be integrat-
ed into public transport ticketing systems even if some limits on the usage of 
the automated DRT are applied. One weakness in the fixed term pricing model 
(in the basic form) is that marginal costs can be captured only as an average. 
The fifth pricing model is the zone pricing model, in which a trip price is 
based on zones travelled or on the zone borders crossed. This model is basical-
ly a combination of flat rate and distance-based pricing. The trip price of is 
always a fixed sum, increasing stepwise as the zone borders are crossed. For 
passengers, the model is rather easy to understand and they can determine the 
trip price in advance if the origin and destination zones are known. In auto-
mated DRT, however, partitioning of the service area into zones can be a com-
plex task if the marginal-cost principle is applied even with a low accuracy. 
Denser partitions would enable a more refined determination of the price as a 
function of trip length to improve capturing the marginal costs. Table 6 sum-
marizes the analysis of the pricing models. As can be seen from the table, none 
of the analyzed pricing models fullfil completely all the four criteria. 
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Table 6 
The Analyzed Pricing Models  
(+ indicates that a pricing model fulfills the numbered criterion)
Pricing model Description Suitability of pricing 
model according to 
the four criteria 
Illustrative exam-
ple 
Flat rate / fixed 
pricing for single 
trip
All kinds of trips with 
fixed price 
1. (Fast growth): + 
2. (Competitiveness): 
3. (Compatibility): 
4. (Marginal cost pric-
ing):
Single bus ticket with 
a fixed price 
Fixed kilometer 
pricing
Fixed starting fee + 
fixed kilometer price, 
based either on driv-
en trip or direct trip 
distance 
1. + 
2.
3.
4. + 
Typical taxi pricing 
scheme
Fixed minute pric-
ing
Fixed starting fee + 
fixed minute fee 
1. 
2.
3.
4. + 
Congestion-related 
element in taxi pric-
ing
Fixed term pricing / 
season ticket 
Fixed price for unlim-
ited travel within a 
time period 
1. + 
2.
3.
4.
Typical frequent 
passenger or com-
muter price scheme, 
typically monthly 
pricing for a certain 
service area 
Zone pricing The price is deter-
mined based on zone 
borders crossed 
1. + 
2.
3.
4. Depends on density 
of partitioning 
Greater Copenhagen 
pricing scheme 

Next, we present the seven pricing principles identified from literature and 
existing transportation services. These principles can be applied to the modifi-
cations of the analyzed five pricing models to impove their suitability for au-
tomated DRT. 
The first principle is the time dependent pricing, in which a trip price can 
vary according to the time of the day. This principle is applied, for example, in 
bus ticket pricing in Helsinki, where the ticket price is higher at nighttime, and 
the same applies to taxi starting fees. In automated DRT, this principle can 
serve many objectives. For instance, a price reduction for off-peak hours could 
attract passenger groups with a lower WTP (or valuation of travel time), such 
as students, retired and unemployed, that is, improving competitiveness in 
certain customer segments (criterion 2). The principle could also intensify fleet 
management by lowering prices for off-peak hours to shift demand from peak 
to off-peak hours, and thereby enable more steady utilization of the fleet ca-
pacity and even alleviate congestions. This principle was also applied in the 
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pricing of the Kutsuplus service in 2015, but the impacts have been unanalyzed 
thus far. However, this objective of the fleet management can contradict with 
the congestion reduction objective if the price reduction for off-peak hours 
leads to increased prices for peak hours (to maintain the budget balance), 
which consequently can lead to increased use of private cars during peak hours 
by travellers whose schedule is inelastic anyway. This issue was considered by 
Glaister, who found that under plausible market conditions, the external costs 
of private car use are so high that reverse peak-load pricing of public transpor-
tation can be reasonable, that is, leading to reductions in social costs (Glaister, 
1974).
The second principle is the discount for preordered trips. A discount may 
depend on the length of the interval between the order time and the requested 
pick-up time. This principle is common for airlines, which give discounts for 
early preordered trips. In automated DRT, the principle could be applied so 
that customers would be allowed to preorder a trip by defining the desired 
pick-up time for hours, days or even weeks beforehand. Preorders may provide 
valuable information about the future trip demand, enabling a more effective 
use of vehicle capacity due to better routing and trip combining. In the long 
run, the preorder information could enable more reliable predictions of the 
daily and hourly demand, which would intensify fleet management even more, 
and thereby reduce costs of the automated DRT operator. Therefore, it would 
be reasonable to give discounts for the preordered trips. From the viewpoint of 
customers, the trip preorder can be seen as a guarantee of service availability. 
One concern related to the preorder option is that it can decrease the instantly 
vacant vehicle capacity, and thereby deteriorate the perceived quality of ser-
vice (availability and waiting times) for those customers who want to use the 
service instantly. However, this concern can be addressed by adjusting fleet 
capacity based on the preorder information. 
The third principle is nonlinear pricing. In its basic form, this means re-
duced prices for frequent users. As we previously stated, this principle is often 
applied for season tickets of public transport (the fourth pricing model). An-
other example from airlines is frequent flier plans with reduced prices. These 
examples illustrate two common means to use nonlinear pricing. The first is to 
reward a customer making a considerable advance purchase (e.g., 30-day tick-
et) with a discounted price. The advance payments improve the liquidity posi-
tion of the service provider through a positive cash flow. The second approach 
to using nonlinear pricing is to reward frequent users with further discounts or 
other privileges. Nonlinear pricing can be an effective tool to attract customers 
for frequent use and to grow the market share of the automated DRT. On the 
other hand, automated DRT can have conflicting objectives. Purely from the 
viewpoint of business objectives, that is, profit maximization, nonlinear pric-
ing can be easily justified. From the viewpoint of the policy objectives set in 
this work, however, the use of nonlinear pricing for automated DRT is a more 
complicated issue, because the objective of improving the attractiveness of 
public transport as a whole and the objectice of maximizing the number of 
(profitable) DRT trips are somewhat contradictory. The other possible con-
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radiction is that nonlinear pricing can encourage customers to make “need-
less” trips, more precisely, a social marginal cost of a trip can exceed the mar-
ginal benefit for the passenger who still makes the trip, if the additional fee is 
relatively low due to the nonlinear pricing. This would be a serious (efficiency) 
problem especially for automated DRT, because a new trip immediately incurs 
significant marginal costs, unlike in conventional public transport with fixed 
routes and schedules where the marginal costs are usually lower. 
The fourth principle is bundling, which means selling and pricing products 
and associated services together as a bundle. In transportation services, bun-
dling can be used to create attractive multimodal travel offers, e.g., a door-to-
door trip that takes place first through a DRT trip from the origin, followed by 
train travel, and finally by a DRT trip to the destination, which can provide a 
competitive alternative to private cars in terms of travel time and price. Trip 
bundling can reduce customer effort to potentially complex and time-
consuming trip combining. A challenge in bundling transport services is the 
complexity of collaboration between several transport operators. For instance, 
in a train plus automated DRT bundle, it is not clear to what extent the cus-
tomer’s WTP for the bundle can be attributed to automated DRT and train 
service. Moreover, the cost structures of transport modes are different. Mar-
ginal costs for automated DRT are significant, whereas (short-run) marginal 
costs for a train are almost zero, but the sunk costs of the railway investments 
are significant. Thus, it is no trivial issue how earnings should be shared. Fur-
thermore, conceivable arguments such as additional value for customers (for 
example, travel time savings and convenience) and costs of service are not eas-
ily measurable when the whole multimodal trip chain is considered. For in-
stance, the valuation of travel time can vary in different parts of the trip chain, 
and some of the transport modes with spesific features (such as proper work-
ing space with internet connection in a train) can be critical for the selection of 
the whole multimodal trip chain instead of using private car.   
The fifth principle is pricing based on fulfilled service, which means that the 
trip price is not fixed before the trip ends. This means that there is an initial 
price based on a pricing model, but the passenger can change the route while 
travelling, which changes also the price. For instance, taxi services typically 
use this principle. As mentioned earlier, taxi services typically adopt a pricing 
model in which the starting fee and the kilometer price are fixed, and then 
apply the fifth principle, that is, customers are allowed to change the destina-
tion during the trip. In automated DRT, this principle would enable flexibility 
for the customers and bring service quality closer to that of a private car and 
taxi. Most likely, passengers would use this option only rarely (depending on 
the extra fee for trip canges), but it can have a crucial option value, that is, a 
customer can rely on that she can change the route if her personal plans 
change. To enable decent flexibility and still maintain an effective vehicle rout-
ing, it should be possible to use other DRT vehicles or even taxi cabs to com-
plete changed trips. 
The sixth principle is pricing based on quality of service. A perceived quality 
of transportation service depends on several factors such as waiting times, 
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travel times, reliability of the promised travel times, safety, and comfort of the 
travel experience. Quality factors that can be controlled and communicated to 
customers can be used as a basis for pricing. This principle is rarely adopted in 
conventional public transport, whereas in airlines, it is quite common, that is, 
direct air connections are typically more expensive than flights with interme-
diate landings and extra comfort is offered in more expensive business classes. 
The possibility to flexibly adjust the automated DRT trip quality with travel 
time promises (linked to the routing algorithm) and related service classes 
enables the service positioning of automated DRT to be competitive against 
different types of transportation services and an attractive tranport mode for 
customers with variable quality requirements. When a customer makes a trip 
request, the automated DRT system can not know beforehand what type of a 
combination of quality and price the customer currently prefers. Therefore, it 
would be beneficial to give several offers with variable quality and price, there-
by increasing the probability that the customer will choose the automated DRT 
service now and in the future even though the quality requirements and WTP 
are changed. 
The seventh principle is price discrimination, which means that different 
buyers are charged different prices for the same good. Pigou (1938) defined 
three degrees of price discrimination. In the first-degree price discrimination 
each buyer pays the price equal to her (personal) WTP. It provides a theoreti-
cal benchmark as a maximal discrimination often referred also as perfect price 
discrimination.  In the second-degree price discrimination different prices are 
set for customer groups segmented according to the WTP. In the third-degree 
price discrimination prices are also set for several customer groups, but the 
segmentation is based on “some practicaple mark”, that is, verifiable customer 
characteristic. The third-degree price discrimination is common for public 
transportation services. For example, students, the unemployed, and pension-
ers receive discounts for a bus ticket price. The main argument for this type of 
price discrimination in public transportation is usually social justice or equity, 
but it can also be justified as revenue maximization because some customer 
segments, like pensioners and students, have usually lower WTP than custom-
ers with a job. For automated DRT, especially the third-degree price discrimi-
nation opens possibities to integrate the pricing model with conventional pub-
lic transportation, for instance, by offering discounts to owners of transit sea-
son ticket. Moreover, discounts for chidren would increase the attractivess of 
automated DRT for families.  
For clarity, we mention that the principles 1, 3 and 6 (time-dependent pric-
ing, non-linear pricing, and pricing based on quality of service) are often also 
seen as discriminatory pricing practices, but these principles are not based on 
verifiable customer characteristic but rather on customers own choices (An-
derson and Renault, 2011). Therefore, these principles cannot be seen as third-
degree price discrimination. Anderson and Renault (2011) note with several 
references that economists often call these principles as second-degree price 
discrimination, even though these principles differs from Pigous’ original defi-
nition. Table 7 summarizes the analysis of the pricing principles. 
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Table 7 
Analyzed pricing principles 
(+=use of pricing principle foster to fulfill the numbered criterion) 
Pricing principle Description Suitability of 
principle accord-
ing to the four 
criteria 
Illustrative exam-
ple 
Time-dependent pric-
ing
Different prices ac-
cording to time of day 
1. + 
2. + 
3.
4. + 
Taxis have higher 
starting fees at night 
and during the eve-
nings 
Discounts for preor-
dered trips
Reduced price if the 
trip is preordered.
Reduction may be 
dependent on the 
time span between 
the order and the trip 
1. 
2. + 
3.
4.
Airlines typically give 
reduced prices for 
preordered trips
Nonlinear pricing 
(basic form), volume-
based pricing
Reduced prices for 
one-time payment of 
several trips or for 
frequent users 
1. ++ 
2. + 
3.
4. + 
Frequent flier plans 
of airlines with re-
duced prices or up-
graded service 
Bundling Bundle of services 
consisting of trav-
el/trips and other 
products and ser-
vices.
Combined bundle of 
connected services
1. + 
2. + 
3. + 
4.
Train + bus bundles, 
i.e., train for main 
routes and bus to 
smaller locations 
Pricing based on ful-
filled service  
Preliminary pricing 
based on a certain 
scheme, but the pas-
senger can change the 
route while traveling, 
which changes pric-
ing
1. 
2. + 
3.
4. + 
The total price of taxi 
trip is based on real-
ized kilometers 
and/or travel time
Pricing based on qual-
ity of service 
A trip price is propor-
tional to the quality 
aspects of the trip 
such as comfort and 
travel time  
1. + 
2. + 
3.
4. + 
Trips by fast intercity 
trains are more ex-
pensive than by regu-
lar trains
Price discrimination Different buyers are 
charged different 
prices for the same 
service
1. + 
2. + 
3. + 
4.
Students get dis-
counts for a bus tick-
et price 
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Our target has been to evaluate alternative pricing models and principles for 
automated DRT. The automated DRT system enables a wide variety of differ-
ent dynamic pricing models and real-time trading mechanisms. Important 
constraints in the adoption of these models are related to customer require-
ments, that is, the pricing model and trading system should be understandable 
and easy to use.  
The other important constraints and requirements are related to the system 
itself. The automated DRT system is dynamic, that is, temporarily and spatial-
ly variable demand can lead the system into different states, unlike in a con-
ventional public transportation system with fixed schedules and timetables. 
Therefore, the adopted pricing model should foster a balance between demand 
and supply and reduce uncontrolled variability of service quality. With these 
constraints and requirements and the four main criteria, we started to identify 
alternatives to an adequate pricing model for automated DRT.  
Firstly, it was obvious that none of the five pricing models in their basic form 
would fulfill all four criteria, as Table 6 depicts. Criterion 2 (exploiting the 
competitive advantages of automated DRT in different customer segments) is 
weakly fullfilled in all the five pricing models. By combining the five basic 
models, however, we can formulate 31 models, including the five basic ones 
(2^5-1=31, where -1 is for an empty set in combinations). Some of these model 
combinations are relevant and common for public transport services. For in-
stance, in Helsinki, bus ticket pricing is based either on the flat rate pricing 
model for a single ticket or on the fixed term pricing model for a season ticket. 
However, some of the combinations seem strange and irrelevant. For instance, 
selling trips simultaneously for a flat rate and a fixed kilometer price or a fixed 
minute price seems unreasonable (unless the flat rate is considered a quaran-
teed price ceiling).  
By applying the seven pricing principles to the models, over 35 billion alter-
native pricing models can be formulated (the number would be even higher 
without the simplifying assumption that there is only one way to apply each 
pricing principle). For instance, pricing models which combine two of the five 
basic models form 10 alternatives that all consist of two components (e.g., flat 
rate and season ticket). Now, for one component, seven principles can be ap-
plied in 2^7=128 different ways. Finally, there are 10l128l128=163 840 alter-
native pricing models of two components. Thus, as the number of alternatives 
for a pricing model is so high, it was obvious that some other research strategy 
than systematic analysis of all alternatives should be chosen. 
We proceeded in the analysis by first identifying the most promising and 
simple alternatives. Then, the problems with these models were improved by 
adding new components and formulating models by applying some of the pric-
ing principles until all four criteria were fulfilled. In the analysis of automated 
DRT, it is important to note that trip trading between a customer and the DRT 
system is assumed to be implemented by a mobile device. This enables rela-
tively simple trading for the customer, e.g., the customer makes a trip request 
and then receives an offer, which she can choose to accept or reject. Simulta-
neously, the pricing model determining the price for the offer can be defined 
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by complex algorithms and utilize real-time information on demand and traf-
fic. Therefore, the complexity of the pricing model is not necessarily as harm-
ful a feature for automated DRT as it would be for transportation services with 
traditional ticket sales. 
From the viewpoint of the four criteria, the most suitable of the five pricing 
models was a fixed starting fee with a fixed kilometer price, which is based on 
a direct trip length. This pricing model is familiar from taxi pricing and there-
fore understandable. The model enables capturing marginal costs to some ex-
tent. However, the model still leaves many criteria weakly or not at all fulfilled. 
To improve the competitiveness of automated DRT for different customer 
segments (criterion 2), we applied the pricing principle based on quality (trav-
el time promises) of service. The DRT system does not know customers’ acute 
needs beforehand regarding travel times. Therefore, providing alternative of-
fers with different promised travel times can be recommended as already ex-
plained with the sixth pricing principle. To keep the trading system simple and 
usable for passengers, we propose that the system should give no more than 
three alternative offers simultaneously. Now, we have defined a relatively sim-
ple trading mechanism and pricing model that enables marginal costs and dif-
ferent customer preferences to be taken into account.  
The proposed model can be formulated further to better respond to market-
specific requirements by applying adequate pricing principles without signifi-
cant or any changes to the trading mechanism. We identified four feasible op-
tions for the further formulation of the proposed pricing model. Firstly, a kil-
ometer price or a starting fee can vary according to the time of day if there is a 
need to balance travel demand between hours. Secondly, nonlinear pricing 
could be applied to trip requests of groups, which can be justified by the fact 
that passenger groups that have the same trip origin and destination enable 
more effective trip combining. Thirdly, concessionary fares should be consid-
ered for children, otherwise a private car would often be a more cost-effective 
alternative for families. Fourthly, customers should have the option to request 
travel bundles of conventional public transport services and the automated 
DRT service, that is, multimodal trip offers, if the objective is to improve the 
competitiveness of the entire public transport compared to a private car.  
The pricing model of the Kutsuplus service, which operated (fully) during 
years 2013 – 2015, applied many similar features and principles with our pro-
posal. It also applied kilometer pricing with a fixed starting fee and offered 
alternative service classes and group discounts. However, the pricing model of 
the Kutsuplus service offered no concessionary fares for children (or for any 
special group). Moreover, the price was the same during peak and off-peak 
hours, except in 2015. The Kutsuplus service was a service pilot of a new and 
unique transport mode. Therefore it is understandable that the pricing model 
was relatively simple rather than “optimal”. However, the distribution of trips 
(presented in Publication 5) indicates that time-dependent pricing should be 
considered if automated DRT or other similar services such as shared taxi ser-
vices reach a more mature phase of the service in order to spread the demand 
peaks.
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Data on passengers’ choices between alternative transportation services or 
offers can provide useful insights into the selection of relevant components for 
the pricing model. We analysed passenger choice data collected from the 
Kutsuplus service, the automated trip ordering system of which provides sim-
ultaneous and alternative trip offers based on the service classes with variable 
prices and travel times. The data collection period extended from 1.9.2014 to 
22.9.2014 (16 workdays). The total number of trip requests was 12 593, and 4 
531 offers were accepted. The average acceptance percentage was 36, and the 
highest acceptance percent (44%) was for trips requested before 7 AM. A dis-
crete choice logit model was adopted to study passenger choices between the 
alternative offers i (service classes), and more precicely, to analyse the impacts 
of the price, ௜ܲ, the travel time estimate, ௜ܶ (announced in the trip offer), and 
the promised maximum delay, ܦ௜ǡ for the choices between the economy class 
and the normal class.  The estimated utility function for an offer i is: 
௜ܸ ൌ െͲǤͲͳ͵ͳ כ ௜ܲ െ ͲǤͳͶͷͺ כ ௜ܶ െ ͲǤͲͶͻͲ כ ܦ௜ǡ
                                          ሺͲǤͲͲͳሻ            ሺͲǤͲʹͳሻ            ሺͲǤͲ͵͸ሻ
where the standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. 
The logit model includes the three decision variables of the DRT system (price, 
travel time estimate, maximum delay) as explanatory variables, which also 
defines the trip offers.  
The ratio of coefficients of the estimated travel time and of the price,that is, 
the marginal rate of substitution, is 11.1 (-0.1458/-0.0131). A straightforward 
interpretation would be that the value of travel time savings for passengers is 
6.6 euros per hour, which is approximately 45% of the average after-tax salary 
in Finland. Thus, the value of travel time for Kutsuplus passengers seems to 
have been quite similar to the typical level. The ratio of coefficients of the 
promised maximum delay and of the price is 3.7 (-0.049/-0.0131). Thus, it 
seems that the customers of the Kutsuplus service are willing to pay at most 
0.037 euros to reduce the maximum delay by one minute.  The estimate of the 
coefficient of the promised maximum delay should be interpreted cautiously, 
because the statistical significance of the variable was only 0.176 whereas the 
other variables of the model (price and travel time) were statistically highly 
significant. From the viewpoint of the pricing model formulation, the present-
ed data and estimations confirm, as expected, that the travel time promise or 
reliable estimate (in offers) can be a relevant component of the pricing model. 
The data indicate the same interpretation also for the promised maximum 
delay, even though, less evidently. 
4.2 Regulationpoliciesandpricing
Public transportation services, including taxi services, have been typically 
regulated by the public autohorities. Regulation of transport can take several 
forms, such as the economic regulation of prices, output, entry and exit, regu-
lation of product quality, safety, and environmental standards (Savage, 2006). 
This work considers only economic regulation of prices and output on the mo-
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nopoly market. Optimal pricing is influenced also by regulation policies other 
than price regulation.  Therefore, it is meaningful and important to study pric-
ing and other regulation policies in conjunction. 
We use the simulation model II to study alternative regulation policies for 
the monopoly market of the automated DRT. On one hand, we are interested 
in the profit of the monopoly, and on the other hand, the level of service and 
the customer surplus. We define social welfare as the sum of profit and cus-
tomer surplus, similarly as in, for example, Yang (2002) and Yang (2005). We 
study impacts of traditional price and output regulation policies on the social 
welfare. Moreover, we propose a new type of real-time regulation policy, ena-
bled by fully automated vehicle dispatching, yielding a significantly higher 
social welfare than the considered traditional regulation policy. 
In this section, the automated DRT is studied as a complementary service to 
conventional bus and taxi services, that is, customers can always choose be-
tween bus, taxi, and DRT. For simplicity, we assume that potential DRT cus-
tomers always have an alternative transportation mode where the surplus is 
zero, which means that a customer chooses the DRT service for a given trip 
only if the expected surplus is positive, forming a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for trip offer acceptance. As described in Section 2.4.2, the demand 
for DRT is modeled as a linear function of price and level of service, which is 
expressed by means of a probability distribution P(accept | Ĳ, ݌௞௠), which de-
notes the conditional probability that an arbitrary customer accepts a proposal 
with theexpected travel time ratio Ĳ and price per kilometer, ݌௞௠.
A monopoly operator controls all the available vehicles with the dispatching 
and routing algorithm. The number of vehicles, denoted by K, and price per 
kilometer (length of trip is measured from direct trip), ݌௞௠, are determined in 
a way that maximizes the daily profit. The optimal number of vehicles and 
price are given by 
ሺܭכǡ ݌௞௠כ ሻ ൌ ௄ǡ௣ೖ೘ ܦ௦݌ െ ܭܥி െ ܥ௏                                                              (39) 
where ܦ௦ is the number of sold trips, p is the average price of a trip, ܥி is the 
fixed cost of vehicle, and ܥ௏ is the variable cost of vehicles (which depends on 
driven kilometers), during one day. ܦ௦, p and ܥ௏ are functions of K and ݌௞௠.
As assumed in the fifth preliminary assumption in Section 2.4.2, the monop-
olist aims to formulate for each trip request a single offer which maximizes the 
expected profit. In other words, the monopolist chooses for each trip (݋௜, ݀௜)
the vehicle so that the expected profit 
ܧሾߨሿ ൌ ܲሺܽܿܿ݁݌ݐȁ߬ǡ ݌௞௠ሻ ή ሺ݌ሺ݋௜ǡ ݀௜ሻ െ ܧሾ߂ܥሿሻ                                                      (40) 
is maximized, where ܲሺܽܿܿ݁݌ݐȁ߬ǡ ݌௞௠ሻ denotes the acceptance probability with 
level of service Ĳ and price per kilometer ݌௞௠. ܧሾ߂ܥሿ denotes the expected in-
crease in the cost of the vehicle route caused by the new potential customer. 
56
Thus, the monopolist has two types of decisions, that is, long run decisions 
defining the fleet size and price per kilometer (equation 39), and daily deci-
sions instantly defining trip offers (equation 40). The traditional regulation 
policy regulates the long run decisions by defining the price and the fleet size 
(potential output) to maximize the social welfare. The new regulation policy, 
the real-time regulation, regulates the daily decisisions. Thus, instead of ex-
pected profit, the vehicle is chosen so that the expected social welfare 
ܧሾܹܵሿ ൌ ܲሺܽܿܿ݁݌ݐȁ߬ǡ ݌௞௠ሻ ή ሺ݌ሺܽǡ ܾሻ െ ܧሾ߂ܥሿሻ ൅ ܧሾܵȁ߬ǡ ݌௞௠ሿ                            (41) 
is maximized, where ܧሾܵȁ߬ǡ ݌௞௠ሿ is the expected surplus defined by equation 
(23).
The simulation model II is adopted to compare the optimal number of vehi-
cles and kilometer price in three cases: 1) monopoly (maximizing profit), 2) 
regulated monopoly (price and fleet size regulation), and 3) real-time regula-
tion , that is, price and fleet size regulation with regulation of vehicle selection 
defined by equation (40). The results of the simulations are summarized in 
Table 8. The table shows the optimal price per kilometer and the optimal 
number of vehicles for each case (market mechanism) together with the corre-
sponding total profit, realized customer surplus, and social welfare. Moreover, 
the number of served customers, the average realized travel time ratio, and the 
relative driven distance are given for the each case. The average travel time 
ratio is determined by dividing the total travel time of customers by the sum of 
direct trip ride times. Thus, it describes the average level of service experi-
enced by the customers. The relative driven distance is calculated by dividing 
the total driven distance of vehicles by the sum of direct trip lengths. Thus, it 
describes how efficiently the vehicles are utilized. The average values in the 
table were calculated over 100 simulation runs with the parameter values 
listed in Table 1 (model II). The average number of requested trips was 43 253 
in each case. 
Table 8 shows that the monopoly yields the highest profit and almost zero 
customer surplus as expected. By regulating the kilometer price and the num-
ber of vehicles of the monopoly to maximize social welfare (case 2), the total 
customer surplus, number of served customers, the average level of service 
and number of vehicles increase slightly, but the optimal price remains the 
same. It seems that price regulation of the DRT monopoly is relatively ineffec-
tive compared to fleet size regulation, because the monopolist can react to reg-
ulated lower price by dropping the service level in daily dispatching decisions, 
and consequently, the generalized price remains almost at the same level. Re-
ferring to the relative driven distance, it can be seen that the monopoly with-
out regulation is slightly more efficient than the regulated monopoly. 
The real-time regulated monopoly (case 3), is a novel attempt to transform 
the monopolist from a profit maximizer to a social welfare maximizer. The 
monopolist’s regulation is focused both on the long-run decisions (price and 
fleet size) and on the daily trip offering decisions to maximize the expected 
social welfare of each trip request, which results in substantially higher social 
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welfare than with the other mechanisms. The result suggests that the automat-
ed DRT and other similar type of new ICT-enabled transportation services, in 
which the vehicle routes are not fixed beforehand, and in which decisions on 
routing and trip offers are delegated from the driver to the automated system 
utilizing real-time information and routing algorithms, enables the social 
planner to adopt new regulation policies that can be much more efficient than 
when adopting only traditional regulation policies such as regulation of price 
and output. 
Table 8 
Simulation of Regulation Policies 
The first columns of the table show the optimal number of vehicles and price per kilo-
meter for the three studied cases. The remaining columns show the corresponding 
average values of surplus, profit, social welfare, number of served customers, realized 
travel time ratio and relative driven distance calculated over 100 runs with the param-
eter values in Table 1. The lower part of the table shows the margin of error of the 
mean of the studied quantities at a 95% confidence level. 
Market 
mechanism 
Number
of vehi-
cles, K 
Price/km, 
p
Surplus Profit Social 
WF
Served 
customers 
Travel 
time
ratio 
Relative 
distance 
1) Monopo-
ly
210 1.65 417 94535 95429 21213 1.688 0.613 
2) Regulat-
ed monopo-
ly
240 1.65 5089 91799 96888 22180 1.642 0.626 
3) Real 
time reg. 
monopoly
320 1.40 31162 81488 112650 29387 1.585 0.660 
Margin of error at a 95% confidence level: 
Surplus Profit Social WF Served cus-
tomers
TTR Relative 
distance 
150 180 200 20 0.0011 0.00029 
4.3 Crowdsensingandpolicyobjectives(publication4)
In this section, we consider connections between the automated DRT and 
crowdsensing-based traffic services expecially from the viewpoint of policy 
objectives for sustainable transportation systems. We focus on crowdsensing 
services, in which real-time travel information can be collected from 
smartphones and utilized in creation of an accurate state description of the 
current transportation system, which can be delivered further to road users in 
different forms, such as general traffic information services, or as more per-
sonal trip and route advices. Such services form a platform for two-sided mar-
kets (Eisenmann et al., 2006) where both the costs and revenues come from 
both sides (travellers and service providers), as both sides have customers, 
that is, travellers can sell their private data and buy (transportation and infor-
mation) services produced with aggregated and refined data. 
All the parties involved in the two-sided market of the crowdsensing-based 
traffic information (consumers, service providers, and a platform operator) are 
influenced by policies targeting for the sustainability of the transportation sys-
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tems and by technological advancements of the intelligent transportation, 
which we identified as the critical external drivers fostering the utilization of 
traffic-related crowdsensing. In addition to external drivers, there are various 
external obstacles, such as national legislation and regulation possibly limiting 
the utilization of the crowdsensing and different technical standards and inter-
faces of the related digital services (like maps and transport route and sched-
ule information) slowing or even temporarily preventing transferring the 
crowdsensing-based traffic services to new countries. Such obstacles may be 
critical in the short-run, whereas the external drivers can be seen influencing 
more in the long-run. In the following, we focus only on the external drivers. 
As explained in Section 1.2, the automated DRT and shared taxi serices have 
been deleloped to increase the attractiveness of public transportation and 
thereby respond to the policy objectives of sustainability. Crowdsensing-based 
traffic services can provide accurate and detailed real-time traffic information 
also for authorities planning and implementing transport policies. For in-
stance, detailed traffic information can be used to optimize congestion charg-
es, and to optimize pricing and allocation of subsidies for alternative public 
transportation modes. Moreover, public transportation operators could utilize 
the real-time traffic information to improve the service level by offering more 
accurate information to passengers and by offering seamless multimodal trip 
chains, where dynamic fleet management and real-time information can be 
utilized to increase the reliability of connections and travel times. This is espe-
cially crusial for travel time promises and related service classes of the auto-
mated DRT. Furthermore, discounts for congestion charges could be applied 
to cars with several passengers to foster ride sharing and shared taxi trips, 
which could be verified with crowdsensing technologies. 
We analysed three crowdsensing-based services from business model and 
sustainability viewpoints in Publication 4. The analysed services are Waze, 
Moovit and TrafficSence.  
Waze is a navigation service based on crowdsourcing providing real-time 
traffic information mainly for private car drivers. It provides typical navigation 
information about roads and crossings, but informs also about travel times, 
and route-related information. The service is owned by Google and has been 
taken into use in many countries and cities. The main difference between 
Waze and traditional navigation services is the reliance on crowd-based infor-
mation. It gathers and complements the data with traffic information provided 
by users. The service is free of charge for travellers, but they are required to 
provide personal traffic information for the service. Users can also manually 
report accidents, traffic jams and bottlenecks, update roads and other map 
data. Additional services are provided, such as information about the cheapest 
fuel station near the user or along the route. Waze collects information from 
users by anonymously collecting traveller speed and location and it has adopt-
ed some gamification features to involve users more deeply and to encourage 
them to provide more information. 
Moovit is a public transport planning service, which features arrival and de-
parture times, updated schedules, local station maps, and service alerts. The 
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service offers real-time public traffic information by relying on location infor-
mation, and it provides a digital map with a view of stops and stations and 
planning based on real-time data of public transport trips. The service is based 
on crowd-sourced information connecting public transit data from transport 
operators to real-time data from crowdsourcing. Travellers send passively and 
anonymously their speed and location data to Moovit, which then connects the 
data with public transit schedules to improve trip planning of travellers. In 
addition to passively sharing data, travellers can also actively send reports 
about traffic delays and quality of service. 
TrafficSense is a pilot service being developed in a research project of Aalto 
University. The envisioned two key features of the service are (1) transporta-
tion mode and route recognition, and (2) learning and prediction of regular 
(and frequent) routes and destinations. Thus, the service can learn and predict 
individual moving entities’ (private individuals, professional drivers, and vehi-
cles) regular and frequent routes and destinations. Combining this prediction 
capability of individual travel intentions with the crowdsensed awareness of 
the current situation of a transportation system facilitates the creation of the 
anticipated state of the transportation system by offering trip advices, which 
takes into account both individuals needs and systemic effects. In contrast, the 
current system level predictions are based on models utilizing real-time traffic 
data and historical data of traffic on roads without any interventions by trip 
advices. 
The analysed three crowdsensing-based services have various potential soci-
etal and environmental impacts. TrafficSense provides more accurate infor-
mation on the current traffic system enabling possibilities for transport au-
thorities to improve transport policies (e.g. optimize congestion charges, taxa-
tion, and subsidies) and for public transportation operators to improve the 
efficiency of fleet management and operations. Both TrafficSense and Moovit 
services can increase the usability and attractiveness of public transportation 
modes, which consequently can decrease the negative externalities of trans-
portation if the public transportation mode is selected instead of private car 
and respectively increase economies of scale of public transportation both on 
the supply and demand side due to the higher occupancy rates in the buses 
and shorter average waiting times on the stops if the bus frequency is in-
creased as a response to the increased demand.  
The societal and sustainability impacts of Waze are two-fold. Waze helps 
drivers to find the best routes and to avoid congestions, which can immediate-
ly reduce the fuel and travel time costs of drivers, and thereby improve the 
efficiency and sustainability of transportation systems at least in the short run. 
However, the long-run impacts on transportation systems are less obvious, 
because Waze can improve the attractiveness of private cars compared with 
public transportation, leading to increased ownership and use of private cars.  
The overall outcome depends on which type of sustainability impacts domi-
nate, positive or negative. One way to strengthen the positive impacts of the 
service could be to put efforts to the development and marketing of the rides-
haring feature of the service, which could increase the occupancy rates of cars. 
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The other way could be to develop features improving park & ride options in 
co-operation with public transportation operators. For instance, car drivers 
heading to the congested city centrum from suburban areas could be informed 
by the service about the fastest train connections and the nearest train stations 
with free parking places or, alternatively, the fastest feeder service (for exam-
ple, bus or DRT) to the train station if the parking place is already found else-
where.
Thus, these crowdsensing-based services open many possibilities to foster 
the sustainability objectives in the transport policy. Technology-driven change 
on transportation market increases a multitude of alternatives for (exclusively) 
use of private car. The crowdsensing-based services can help travellers to find 
the best travel options easily from this multitude, which could otherwise be a 
difficult task due to the tight schedules of the transportation services and of 
the travellers themselves. For instance, service offers of the automated DRT 
and shared taxi services with travel time promises for passengers can be valid 
only for short time-windows. As mentioned, the trip advices based on 
crowdsensing data and prediction of intentions can be adopted to direct the 
transportation system to the anticipated state. For the same reason, these ad-
vices can be given also to taxi and DRT fleets, and even utilized in the real-time 
regulation of the automated DRT described in Section 4.2.   


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5. Conclusions and Disscussion 
The first main research question of this work, “How do automated DRT and 
shared taxi services differ from other public transportation services and how 
should these differenses be modelled in economic analysis?” was considered 
by taking several complementary methodological approaches, first by means of 
analytical economic modelling in Section 2.2 and its extensions in Sections 
4.1.1 and 4.1.2 (Publication 1), then by adopting two simulation models intro-
duced in Section 2.3. The main difference of DRT compared with regular bus 
services is the lack of fixed schedules and routes, and when compared with 
regular taxi service, the main difference is that the rides are shared, that is, the 
automated DRT and shared taxi services combine trips. The automated dis-
patching system enables responding to the trip requests instantly based on 
real-time information of vehicle location, routes, and traffic situation even 
with high demand levels and large DRT fleets, which also forms the main dis-
tinction between the automated DRT and traditional DRT offered typically to 
special customer groups or on rural areas with low demand levels.  
The trip combining in DRT potentially increases the travel time externalities 
due to route changes required to serve a new passenger. The average travel 
time cost of DRT trip (k) depends on the prevailing levels of trip demand (X), 
trip production (R), and average trip distance (a). This dependence was de-
scribed by the function ݇ ൌ ܭሺܴǡ ܺǡ ܽሻ, and the related travel time externality 
the new passenger causes for other DRT passengers was expressed by డ௄డ௑ ܺ.
Respectively, the related travel time saving induced by the increase in trip 
production was expressed by డ௄డோ ܺ. From the possibility for route changes fol-
lows that the externality డ௄డ௑ ܺ can be much higher in DRT than in bus services. 
On the contrary, an increase in route production decreases the required route 
changes. Thus, the possibility for route changes is an essential difference be-
tween DRT and regular bus service, which naturally reflects on the analytical 
models of these transportation modes, for example in Pedersen’s model of 
public transportation, route production is not included to the travel time func-
tion (Pedersen, 2003), which is well-founded if the routes are fixed. 
The average waiting time cost of DRT trip (q) was described with function 
ݍ ൌ ܳሺܴǡ ܺሻ. An increase in R, that is, an increase in the number of vehicles 
operating in the service area decreases the average distance between the dis-
patched vehicle and the pick-up point, and thereby decreases the average wait-
ing time. Respectively, an increase in the number of passengers increases the 
average route length to the pick-up point and (expected) number of stops be-
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fore the pick-up point, which increases the average waiting time. In contrast, 
the waiting time of the bus service with fixed routes is affected basically only 
by route production (or more precisely, by bus frequency on fixed routes) and 
the effect of the demand level is insignificant except in case buses are full and 
part of the passengers cannot hop in the first arriving bus they are waiting for. 
Therefore, the waiting time in bus services is modeled usually as a function of 
trip production, but not as a function of the demand level, whereas in the 
models of taxi services, a waiting time is modelled often somewhat similarly to 
our waiting time function, that is, as a function of demand and vacant vehicles 
(see, for example, Yang et al. (2010) and Yang & Yang (2011)). However, the 
mechanism of other passengers influencing the waiting time of taxi service is 
simpler than in automated DRT and shared taxi services, because once a va-
cant call taxi is dispatched to the customer, it can normally drive the shortest 
possible route to the pick-up point. Moreover, our simulation studies (Publica-
tion 2) indicated that a waiting time in the DRT service is more stable than in 
the taxi service if the demand level suddenly increases. 
We also analysed the cost structure of DRT (in Section 2.2), which resenbles 
the cost structure of the taxi service, but is somewhat more complex, once 
again, due to the trip combining and related route changes. Moreover, the 
costs of DRT were examined with simulation models. In Section 3, the simula-
tions showed that the automated DRT can be more cost-effective than private 
car and regular taxi, if the scale of the trip production is sufficiently high. 
Thus, the answer to the second main question of the work (Is the automated 
DRT cost-effective compared with a private car and a regular taxi service from 
the viewpoints of consumers and society?) is a “conditional yes” on the condi-
tion that demand density and fleet size are sufficient. However, these condi-
tions can be challenging to fulfill especially for public transportation operators 
simultaneosly facing both political requirements, for instance, related to the 
service area and budget constraints limiting the fleet size. We presented em-
pirical data on the Kutsuplus service in Section 4 (Publications 1 and 5), whith 
the average occupancy rate being relatively low and subsidization rate high, 
which can be interpreted, based on our simulation results, that both the de-
mand and supply levels, that is, the scale level has been too low for efficient 
trip combining. In Section 4.1.4 (Publication 5) we proposed integrated pricing 
models of the automated DRT and other public transportation modes to in-
crease the attractiveness of public transportation in general and to raise sim-
ultanaeously demand for the automated DRT.  
The third main research question, “How should the automated DRT and 
shared taxi services be priced and regulated to maximize social welfare?”, was 
considered first by the analytical models and exploratory analysis focusing on 
pricing policies in Section 4.1. The pricing and other regulation policies were 
then explored in conjuction with the simulation model in Section 4.2. In all the 
three versions of the analytical model, the optimal price level for trips is equal 
to the marginal costs of operator plus external travel time and waiting time 
costs to the passengers minus value of travel time and waiting time savings 
from increased route production (demand side scale economies), and the op-
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timal trip production is equal to the potential trip production multiplied by the 
upper limit of the occupancy rate, which was exogeniously given, and based on 
empirical data from the Kutsuplus service in the numerical examples. The 
modelling of the occupancy rate as an endogenious variable would be one in-
teresting direction for the future model development, and empirical depend-
ence between the scale and the occupancy rate is an important issue for policy 
design. Our simulations indicate that this dependence is strong in the auto-
mated DRT and consequently enables the supply side scale economies. Moreo-
ver, optimal capacity decisions were defined for variable demand levels with a 
fairly detailed cost function. However, an extension of the model by adding 
costs of instantaneous adjustments in the fleet size would be useful for evaluat-
ing benefits of dynamically flexible fleet size compared to fixed fleet size as in 
the Kutsuplus service. 
The analytical models defined the first-best pricing policies, which provide a 
basis for the wider consideration of the automated DRT and shared taxi ser-
vices as a part of the urban transportation system where many contraints typi-
cally prevail. For instance, one contraint with high relevance for transport pol-
icies is the lack of congestion pricing in congested cities, leading to the under 
pricing of private car use during peak hours, which is one common argument 
for subsidization of public transport in addition to the scale economies. Small 
and Verhoef (2007) derive these two sources of second-best public transport 
subsidies when private car toll is fixed at zero, and they conclude that insofar 
as lowering public transport price is effective in reducing congestion costs by 
drawing away private car users, it is desirable to use subsidies for that objec-
tive. This result, in general, is valid also for automated DRT and shared taxi 
services, but opens also some relevant follow-up questions, such as, whether 
these new transport services can be more effective in reducing congestion costs 
than conventional public transport for certain segments of private car users, 
and whether the effectiveness of subsidies increased by combining these new 
services and the traditional public transport modes? The second-best analysis 
of these questions remains for future research.  
However, we have identified potential benefits of the mode combining from 
the passenger viewpoint and suggested pricing models for the implementation 
of the mode combining. Thus, the mode combining is realizable (even though 
it requires substantial technical preparations) and can be recommended for 
consideration especially in cities where a significant proportion of passengers 
suffer from too many transfers in public transport or avoid using transit be-
cause of transfers and uncertain connections. Related to the policy design of 
these new services, we underline that the automated routing and dispacthing 
algorithms utilized in these services enable also new regulation policies such as 
the real-time regulation policy, which improved social welfare in our simula-
tions of Section 4.2 (Publication 3). Furthermore, adoption of crowdsensing-
based services provides possibilies to intensify these policies even more. 
In addition to the second-best analysis and empirical modelling of occupancy 
rate, there are other important directions for future research. Modelling and 
measuring the degree of product differentiation of automated DRT, shared 
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taxis, and other transport modes would improve our knowledge on the impacts 
and possibilities of these new services for urban transport systems. Moreover, 
stochastic aspects of demand, effects of crowding (Palma et al. 2015) and het-
erogeneity of passengers with respect to trip purpose and demographic varia-
bles should be taken into account, especially in empirical demand models of 
these services. Improved demand models would enhance more efficient de-
mand and fleet capacity management and pricing policies, which would also 
reduce uncertainty in waiting and travel times induced by variances in spatial 
stochastic demand levels. Furthermore, acceptability issues, both from the 
viewpoints of customers and taxi industry, are important when designing and 
analysing these new services and related policies.  
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman visioned in 1996 the future of the urban trans-
portation: “Today the roads belong mainly to hordes of share-a-ride minivans, 
efficiently routed by a web of intercommunicating computers” (Krugman, 
1996). The literature reviewed in this work show that similar visions of future 
transportation have been presented earlier in the field of transportation sci-
ence, and related mathematical and technical problems have been studied in 
diciplines of transportation engineering and operations research. The present-
day automated DRT services resemble in many ways Krugman’s vision, except 
that roads do not belong mainly to minivans. The market share of all motor-
ized trips has still been quite small, but, for instance, the daily trip numbers of 
the Kutsuplus service increased relatively fast during the pilot period of years 
2013 – 2015. Respectively, taxi companies are currently developing and testing 
shared taxi services, which also resembles closely the vision of the share-a-ride 
minivans. Moreover, the globally operating transportation network company, 
Uber, announced in 2014 a new service called UberPool, which enables unfa-
miliar passengers to share a ride and split the bill by using a mobile applica-
tion to call a ride. Currently, Uber, Lyft, and Split Technologies, which utilizes 
the same algorithms as the Kutsuplus service, are competing for markets of 
shared rides in Washington D.C.  
Thus far, the long-run market shares of new ride sharing services like Split 
and UberPool remain an open question. In addition, it is yet unclear which 
kinds of forms of these services will succeed commercially, and how these ser-
vices are combined with traditional public transportation services. However, 
their potential to solve globally critical urban transportation problems by in-
creasing the average occupancy rate of vehicles in the urban areas can be sig-
nificant, especially in the future, due to the development of driverless vehicles, 
which can enable substantial cost and price reductions.  
The publications presented in this dissertation contribute to this field of re-
search by presenting simulation models, empiral studies, and analytical mod-
els providing theoretical foundations for further policy analysis and empirical 
research on the automated DRT and shared taxi markets which continually 
evolve, owing to the advances in intellingent transportation technologies and 
increasing political pressures for sustainable transportation. 
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